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Abstract
Occupational deviance in the form of cellphone contraband introduction poses a
serious threat to the safe and secure operations of correctional facilities across the United
States. More importantly, security staff members who participate in this form of
unethical and illegal behavior undermine and impair both staff-inmate relationships as
well as collegial relationships among officers. The purpose of this study was to explore
the perspectives of correctional officers who have experienced contraband introduction
by fellow correctional officers and to understand the overall impact within the
correctional environment. Based on ethical climate theory, this qualitative
phenomenological study sought to describe the contributions of social factors as well as
organizational policy practices regarding cellphone contraband introduction by
correctional officers. Through phenomenological data analysis, findings indicated that
correctional officers were more likely to ascribe universal responsibility to both the
organization and officer violators and to believe that contradictions within the
organizational climate inadvertently reinforced cellphone contraband introduction among
fellow officers. Recommendations included alternative interview options, expanding the
geographical search area for sampling, exploring factors within the organization that
could impact the organizational climate, and comparing climate-related acts of deviance
in other correctional settings. The data provided in this study adds additional insight for
correctional administrators into the necessity of a multifaceted approach to addressing
officer-involved cellphone contraband introduction.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
An organization’s ability to function is reliant on the quality of the individuals
within it, which is especially true within the field of corrections. Within the last 20 years,
corrections officials have noticed an unsettling surge in occupational deviance especially
as it relates to cellphone contraband introduction (Burke & Owen, 2010; Roth, 2011).
Cellphone contraband is not a localized issue that only affects select areas but has been
identified as a global problem (Burke & Owen, 2010). Cellphones within prisons
threaten the safety, security, and stability of the correctional environment and pose a
significant risk of danger to both inmates as well as staff members within the facility
(Grommon, Carter, & Scheer, 2018; Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985) because these devices
allow for the continuation of criminal activity as well as unmonitored access to society
(Burke & Owen, 2010). Cellphones in prisons have been linked to activities such as
extortion, escape attempts, drug trafficking, gang activity, and even murder plots (Burke
& Owen, 2010; Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985; Roth, 2011). For example, a 2008 case in
Texas highlighted the dangers of cellphone contraband in prisons when an inmate
contacted a well-known state senator from a contraband cellphone and threatened the
safety of his adult daughters (Graczyk, 2008). Similarly, a recent South Carolina case
brought the indictments of 34 individuals from Georgia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina who were all accused of aiding in a large-scale drug trafficking case by inmates
orchestrating distribution with the help of contraband phones (Waters, 2017). In Florida,
several employees were arrested for attempted contraband introduction after it was
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discovered the employees were illegally communicating with an inmate serving a life
sentence (Wear, 2018). This inmate was also involved in sexual relationships with at
least two of the officers arrested and was attempting to exploit the sexual relationships to
force their assistance with methamphetamine distribution within the facility (Wear,
2018). And although these may seem like isolated cases, they are more common than not
within American corrections regardless of size.
Besides California, nine southern states—South Carolina, Oklahoma, Georgia,
Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and Arkansas—had the highest
cellphone confiscation rates within their prisons than any of other states in the nation
(Riley, 2017). Corrections officials in one of these southern states appear to understand
the importance of eliminating the issue of cellphone contraband (Cook, 2015; Rankin,
2015; Riley, 2017). This particular state is identified as having the fourth largest
corrections department in the nation and ranked within the top 10 departments with the
highest rates of cellphone contraband. Further, cellphone contraband confiscation rates
in this particular state were the third-highest in the nation (Riley, 2017) compared to
states with the three largest departments of corrections—Texas, California, and Florida
which are the largest, second-largest, and third-largest, respectively—in the United States
(“Cell Extortion,” 2015). Corrections officials are aggressively targeting cellphone
contraband introduction within their facilities in attempts to curb the problem in many
states around the country. For instance, corrections officials in one state reported a
15.02% reduction in contraband from 16,322 incidents in 2016 to 13,870 incidents in
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2017 with 8,081 reported cellphone contraband confiscations in state prison facilities
(Georgia Department of Corrections, 2018).
The confiscation rates of cellphone contraband highlight an alarming problem that
has increased in urgency over the years with the exposure of a number of high-profile
cases involving inmates in possession of cellphone contraband. One such case involved a
jury duty scam in which inmates within a Georgia prison contacted citizens and
threatened them with arrest warrants for not reporting to jury duty (“Cell Extortion,”
2015; Seville, 2016). The unsuspecting victim would be instructed to pay a “fine” using
Greendot cards, which were eventually traced back to the inmates (“Cell Extortion,”
2015; Seville, 2016). In a 2016 sting operation, 46 correctional officers in Georgia were
indicted and later convicted and sentenced for their participation in one of the largest
corruption scandals to affect the department (Cook, 2017). The correctional officers were
identified as participants in contraband smuggling—which included cocaine,
methamphetamine, and cellphones—at numerous institutions across the state in
conjunction with one of the state’s most problematic prison gangs—the Ghost Face
Gangsters (Cook, 2017). Shortly after the mass indictments of correctional officers, an
inmate was indicted for the 2014 murder of a 9-month-old baby, which was the result of a
retaliation hit he ordered from his prison cell on a contraband cellphone (Harris, 2016;
Reed, 2016; Saul, 2016). The hit was approved and ordered via cellphone by the
inmate—a member of Sex, Money, Murder gang—and his superiors—who were serving
time at a supermax federal facility in Colorado at the time of the murder—in retaliation
for the murder of a fellow gang member perpetrated by the baby’s uncle (Harris, 2016;
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Reed, 2016; Saul, 2016). In 2018, another inmate was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment plus 20 years for ordering a hit on a man who owed him $500 (Barker,
2018; Yeomans, 2018). The inmate ordered the hit from a contraband cellphone he had
received while in prison serving time for a previous murder (Barker, 2018; Yeomans,
2018). Cases such as these present the clear and apparent dangers associated with
cellphone contraband in prisons.
Although cellphone contraband is often introduced by a variety of sources,
correctional officers who participate in this form of deviant behavior create the greatest
risk to their organization due to the associated relational impacts. Correctional
administrators struggle to manage cellphone contraband, which creates a wide range of
problems both within correctional facilities and in the general public. Because of this,
there is a greater sense of urgency to understand the impacts of this problem from the
perspective of those who are at greater risk due to this exposure.
Background
In order to understand perceptions related to cellphone contraband introduction,
an extensive review of the relevant literature was conducted. Deviance literature
highlighted individual, within-group, and organizational factors such as poor pay, societal
isolation, within-group assimilation, and job satisfaction as contributors to employee
deviance (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Biron, 2010; Cook, 2017; Farnese, Bello, Livi,
Barbieri, & Gubbiotti, 2016; Ferris, 2009; Ivkovic, 2005; Norman, Avey, Nimnicht, &
Pigeon, 2010; Riley, 2017; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998; Souryal, 2009; Thau,
Bennett, Mitchell, & Marrs, 2009; Thompson, 2009). However, the corrections
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profession is underrepresented throughout this literature, which created generalizability
concerns. The scope of corrections literature was limited in regard to deviance and was
primarily limited to inappropriate relationships and boundary violations (Donner,
Maskaly, & Thompson, 2018; Mahfood, Pollock, & Longmire, 2013; Maillicoat, 2005;
Souryal, 2009; Worley & Worley, 2016). There was also an identifiable discrepancy
regarding culpability (officers or inmates) in deviant workplace activities (Dial &
Worley, 2008; Marquart, Barnhill, & Balshaw-Biddle, 2001; Worley, 2016; Worley &
Cheeseman, 2006; Worley, Marquart, & Mullings, 2003; Worley, Tewksbury, &
Frantzen, 2010) and a deficiency in self-report data related to correctional officers’
experiences with contraband activity. The recency of contraband literature reiterated key
concepts of deviance and corrections literature by presenting concerns with pay, job
satisfaction, within-group socialization issues, and underreporting related to officer codes
of silence as relative factors in contraband introduction (Burke & Owen, 2010; CAPI,
2016; Grommon et al., 2018; Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985; Roth, 2011; York, 2016).
However, researchers have not provided any explanation for ethical considerations or
climate contributions from the perspective of correctional officers. Further, the majority
of this information was based on secondary studies and reviews of available studies as
opposed to direct studies. Lastly, the climate literature reported ways in which climate
influences organizational behaviors—especially through affective and perceptual factors
(Ivkovic, 2005; Schneider, Ehbart, & Macey, 2013; Taxman, Cropsey, Melnick, &
Perdoni, 2008; Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). However, similar to deviance
literature, the studies’ populations consisted of non-corrections professionals which again
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limited generalizability. This study aimed to remedy these gaps by exploring ways in
which contraband activity by fellow officers impacts the organizational and within-group
perspectives of non-participatory correctional officers.
Problem Statement
Institutional structure, social order, and behavioral management are the primary
responsibilities of security staff within correctional institutions (Ferdik & Smith, 2016;
McKelvey, 1977). Any behavior that contradicts ethical, moral, and formally established
mores directly undercuts institutional authority as well as safe and secure operations
within a correctional facility (Henry, 1998). Cellphone contraband introduction by
security staff is a contemporary example of immoral and illegal behavior that undermines
organizational policy and standards within corrections. Correctional experts and
researchers agree that cellphone contraband introduction is problematic across many
correctional departments (Cook, 2015, 2017; Graczyk, 2008; Rankin, 2015; Reed, 2016;
Riley, 2017; Saul, 2016; Seville, 2016; Smith, 2018; Associated Press, 2018; Thompson,
2009), warranting increased attention for the identification of suitable remedies. Limited
qualitative data exists that provides substantial exploration of the impact of this behavior
relative to both organizational climate and deviancy as well as the overall correctional
environment. The collection and analysis of additional relevant data allows for greater
insight into cellphone contraband introduction perpetrated by correctional officers.
Further, it allows for additional clarification of systemic factors—including both
institutional and social factors as well as current regulatory policies—that may exacerbate
this particular form of occupational deviancy within correctional settings.
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Purpose of the Study
Cellphone contraband introduction is detrimental to institutional safety and secure
offender management. The current body of literature lacks specificity in regard to
rationale behind officer participation in cellphone introduction as well as reporting
behaviors by noncomplicit officers. Because of this, a greater need for deeper exploration
into significant acts of deviance—in this case, cellphone contraband introduction—exists.
In addition to causing damage within individual institutions, cellphone contraband is
equally disruptive to the supervising agencies as well as the surrounding communities.
Security staff are often held to a higher standard as compared to other staff (i.e., food
service, civilian, medical, mental health, etc.) due to their perceived power and control
within the correctional organization. The authority ascribed to these individuals
intensifies the negative impact associated with participation in this level of occupational
deviancy. The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perspectives of
correctional officers (of all rankings) who have experienced contraband introduction by
other security staff.
Research Questions
The following central research question and two subquestions regarding
correctional officer cellphone contraband introduction and climate influence were
developed based on the identified problem statement and purpose of the study.
Central question: How do cellphone contraband violations by correctional officers
impact the perceptions of other correctional officers regarding cellphone
contraband prevention in state prisons?

8
SQ1: How does correctional climate encourage cellphone contraband
introduction by correctional officers?
SQ2: How does the correctional climate impact reporting of cellphone
contraband violators by non-complicit officers?
Theoretical Framework
Victor and Cullen’s (1988) ethical climate theory was the applicable theoretical
reference for guiding this research. According to this theoretical tenet, organizations are
comprised of specific ethical climates relative to “position, tenure, and workgroup
membership” (Victor & Cullen, 1988, p. 101). Ethical climates are identified based on
five categories: law and code, independence, rules, caring, and instrumentalism (Victor &
Cullen, 1988). Victor and Cullen suggested sociocultural and organizational factors
encourage the overall development of ethical climate, which is explained further in the
next chapter. This theory supported the research by accounting for the organizational and
sociocultural influences of cellphone contraband introduction within prisons (as
addressed in the central question and RQ1). Additionally, ethical climate theory helped
further exploration into the role of non-complicit correctional officers as well as their
interactions with and perceptions of their work environments following their awareness
of cellphone contraband introduction (as addressed in the central question and RQ2).
Nature of the Study
Qualitative methodology was most appropriate for this research. Problems and
issues in need of in-depth exploration are most suitable for qualitative research (Creswell,
2013). Researchers who identify a “need to study a group or population, to identify
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variables that cannot be easily measured, or to hear silenced voices” while establishing “a
complex, detailed understanding of an issue” (Creswell, 2013, p. 48) are best served with
a qualitative methodological approach. Because of the unique nature and depth of this
problem, qualitative methodology presented as most appropriate for the examination of
how and why cellphone contraband introduction occurs at the hands of correctional
security staff. Moreover, the alignment of the established purpose and corresponding
research questions assists with the conceptualization of both known and unknown
contributory factors that continue to counteract current preventative measures.
Cellphone contraband introduction is a problem not experienced by society as a
whole. Instead, it is exclusive within a certain type of environment—correctional
facilities—and experienced by a specific group of people—staff and inmates within the
correctional environment. The individuals who are the most knowledgeable of this
particular phenomenon of interest are those who are most impacted by it on a regular
basis—correctional officers. As such, a phenomenological study design was employed as
most effective in understanding the ways in which correctional officers are effected by
cellphone contraband introduction by other officers. This particular design choice also
provided for exploration of underlying themes relative to the overall understanding of
contraband introduction through the lived experiences of study participants (Creswell,
2013). The central purpose of phenomenological research is to provide qualitative
insight into the lived experiences of a particular situation or phenomenon; additionally, I
was able to focus on the experiences of the participants with limited focus on social or
cultural norms, preconceived notions, or values in order to identify shared themes that
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collectively explained their experiences with the established phenomenon. Participants in
this study consisted of a group of officers who met a specific set of criteria including
length of time as correctional officers and previous exposure to incidents of cellphone
contraband introduction. I interviewed these individuals using a semistructured
questioning strategy and analyzed their responses using phenomenological data analysis.
Assumptions
The assumptions of this research provided the contextual foundations for the
study. First, it was anticipated that participants would have differing interpretations of
interview questions, different lived experiences as correctional officers, and different
ethical beliefs which would inform their interview responses. It was also expected that
participants would answer the interview questions honestly. Finally, I assumed that the
findings associated with this study would be reflective of correctional officers who work
in state prison facilities. The nature of prison environments varies based on population,
size, demographics, security-level, and so on; consequently, the experiences of
correctional officers in similarly defined prison environments could relate to the
experiences of participants identified in this study.
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this study reflected the perspectives of corrections officers in order
to supplement the qualitative literature focused on contraband introduction. The study
focused on the lived experiences of correctional officers exposed to this particular form
of employee deviance. This study does not account for the experiences of nonsecurity
staff working within the corrections environment. Additionally, the perspectives of
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upper-level management and administration were also not considered. Even though no
two prisons operate in an identical manner, I did not incorporate facility-specific
concerns into the research. The outcome of this study provided some insight into the
perspectives of those who have experienced cellphone contraband introduction by fellow
officers as well as the impact of this behavior and how correctional officers viewed their
organization and their coworkers as a result of such incidents.
Limitations
This study demonstrated a unique set of limitations relative to the problem as well
as the population of study. For one, the study involved participants from one
geographical location—a state in the southeastern United States—which could impact
generalizability to other sites. Additionally, the study focused on the lived experiences of
one particular subgroup within the prison staff population—correctional officers—which
could also affect generalizability across other staff groups. The study was also timelimited with only one data collection event. Because of this, the data reflected
participants’ perspectives at a specific period in time and does not account for any
changes that may have occurred in the passage of time since interviewing. Researchers
have previously addressed difficulty in accessing participants within law enforcement
agencies due to excessive secrecy and distrust of outside authorities. This practice, which
often limits the availability of research data within this area, has been identified as the
“code of silence” within law enforcement and the “correctional officer code” among
corrections security staff. Bureaucratic restrictions by prison administrators in efforts to
prevent public awareness of internal problems might restrict or prevent on-site access to
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research participants. To account for this, I recruited and interviewed participants off-site
in order to maintain anonymity of their voluntary participation and encourage response
authenticity. Even with off-site recruitment, participant reluctance due to implicit
correctional officer codes remained a consistent limitation of this study even with
reassurances regarding anonymity and confidentiality. As a result, a number of
participants who initially agreed to participate in this study subsequently declined further
participation in data collection. I was still able to use multiple participant responses in
order mitigate validity concerns related to variability in experience.
Definitions
The following definitions of terms are provided to facilitate understanding of the
contextual meaning of specific terms as applied to this body of research.
Code of silence or thin blue line: As defined by Plouffe (2012), “the unwritten
rule that a police officer does not report, complain about, or testify against a fellow police
officer. It is also commonly referred to as the ‘thin blue line’.” This construct makes
research efforts involving law enforcement agencies difficult as personnel—especially
officers—are not typically forthcoming with information (Payne, 2005). Studies into
misconduct or deviant behaviors are often difficult to conduct through self-report data as
distrust and suspicion of researchers and research intent is high among officer
participants (Payne, 2005).
Correctional officer code: Similar to the code of silence in police organizations,
this is an informal code of conduct that discourages speaking against fellow officers or
violations by fellow officers, requires that officers provide unconditional support to one
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another, and prohibits officer familiarity with and cooperation in illegal activities with
inmates (Kauffman, 2005). This code also reinforces isolation and separatism from other
staff members by supporting an “us versus them” mentality among officers (Kauffman,
2005).
Deviance: Conduct that is generally considered by members of a social system as
“wrong, bad, immoral, illegal, or worthy of condemnation or punishment” (Jensen,
2007).
Ethical climate: As an extension of organizational climate, ethical climate refers
to the “general and pervasive characteristics of organizations, affecting a broad range of
decisions” and is defined by five dimensions: law and code, instrumentalism,
independence, caring, and rule (Victor & Cullen, 1988).
Occupational deviance: For the purposes of this study, the definition of
occupational deviance incorporates components of both Robinson and Bennett’s (1995)
and Friedrichs’ (2002) definitions as voluntary behavior that is self-serving and
counterproductive in nature, violating both formal and informal occupational norms and
threatening to the well-being of the organization, its members, or both.
Organizational climate: Fluctuating characteristic within an organization that is
contingent upon external environmental factors such as employee behavior and attitude
(Ashkanasy & Doris, 2018).
Social distance: Refers to the appropriate level of social interactions between
individuals based on relationship dynamics (Brazill, 2003). For this research, social
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distance will be addressed in terms of violations of appropriate social boundaries (or
“boundary violations” in text) among correctional staff and inmates.
Staff: Refers to all members who work within the organizational setting regardless
of group identification or title (Mahfood et al., 2013). In this research, correctional
officers will be identified by their professional title in order to provide internal
consistency and distinction from other organizational members.
Use of force: Legitimate power granted to only police by the state that allows
officers to use necessary force against uncooperative citizens (Beausoleil, 2012). This
power is generally limitless and allows officers to forcefully compel submission in order
to protect society (Beausoleil, 2012). It is important to note that legal acceptance of this
granted authority does not always equate to moral legitimacy as some uses of force are
deemed legal even when they are immoral (Beausoleil, 2012).
Significance
This study was significant because it provided increased understanding of
occupational deviance—specifically in the form of cellphone contraband introduction—
among correctional officers. The current deficiency in the available literature evinced the
need for additional research that qualitatively explored ethical foundations within the
correctional climate. The majority of the literature in this area provided insight into
occupational deviance relative to inappropriate sexual relationships/conduct with
inmates, inmate perceptions of rogue correctional officers, as well as typologies
associated with inmate manipulators and generalized categorical definitions of deviant
correctional officers. Increasing occurrences of this form of occupational deviance
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served as further validation of the growing importance of this phenomenon. The
exploration of correctional officers’ experiences with contraband introduction provided
increased insight into the role of organizational ethics and the impact of these ethical
guidelines on staff perspectives within the work environment. The use of participant
responses from correctional officers who work within one of the largest correctional
departments in the United States allowed for greater application of this study’s findings
to the body of literature regarding prison contraband introduction. Findings from this
study could provide administrative insight into the organizational and social factors that
continue to unknowingly exacerbate this problem, as well as assist with specialized
training development and modification.
Summary
The gap presented in the current literature allowed for greater exploration into the
pervasive problem of cellphone contraband introduction. The current literature presented
data that outlines general characteristics of individuals who participate in deviant
workplace behaviors as well as basic typologies of officers who participate in
occupational deviance. Researchers have also presented economic, social, and
environmental factors; however, none of these factors provided a solid justification for
why these officers chose to engage in deviant behaviors. Additionally, the literature
provided little explanation for how these experiences affect those who were exposed to
deviance—specifically cellphone contraband introduction—during the course of their job
performance. With this study, I attempted to remedy these unaddressed concerns through
qualitatively supported correctional officer data. The next chapter provides an in-depth
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examination of the current literature, highlights gaps, and presents justification for the
current body of research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The introduction of cellphone contraband by correctional officers remains an
widespread problem for prison organizations. Sometimes contraband is introduced by
visitors or civilian staff; however, officers are just as susceptible to this form of deviance
as non-sworn individuals. Everyday citizens are often astonished and disheartened at the
news that a corrections officer has been accused of introducing cellphone contraband into
a correctional facility. Low pay is often attributed as the greatest contributing factor to
deviant behavior among correctional officers (Cook, 2017; Riley, 2017; Souryal, 2009;
Thompson, 2009), and although this may be true it is not always the case. As salaried
employees within a single department, correctional officers make roughly the same
amount, but not all participate in this type of behavior; therefore, it is hard to rely solely
on low compensation as an explanation for this type of deviant behavior when it presents
as the exception rather than the norm. Other potential contributing factors identified
include work-related stress (Worley, 2016), feeling unsupported or uncared for within the
organization (Worley & Worley, 2011, 2013), feeling devalued or unappreciated by the
organization (Worley, 2016), and low education (York, 2016). However, even in
consideration of these alternative possible contributors, researchers have been unable to
unequivocally identify any one factor as the sole reason behind employee deviance in
corrections. Following an explanation of search strategy, this chapter examines the
theoretical foundation that supported the basis for this research as well as the available
literature regarding workplace deviance, corrections, contraband, and organizational
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climate. The major concepts identified in this literature review provided the foundation
for the study.
Literature Search Strategy
Despite the number of cases illustrating the dangers of cellphone contraband,
there is little literature available to guide correctional policies and legislature in
determining best practices for combating this problem. The purpose of this study was to
qualitatively conceptualize the experiences of corrections officers exposed to cellphone
contraband introduction by fellow officers. This chapter provides an exhaustive review
of the relevant literature through the use of peer-reviewed journals and articles, books,
and government data accessed through the Thoreau multi-database system on the Walden
University library website using keywords such as deviance, corrections officers, prison,
corruption, code of silence, blue wall, workplace deviance, occupational deviance,
organizational deviance, workplace corruption, ethics, ethical climate, and officer code.
However, a review of the literature demonstrated a deficit in the literature focused on
qualitative studies of contraband introduction and the impact it has on those who work in
these environments. Further, the literature was deficient in identifying the ways in which
the organizational climate of the correctional environment contributes to deviant
behavior, specifically pertaining to cellphone contraband introduction. Correctional
literature was limited to boundary violators (both inmate and correctional officers) and
inappropriate relationships (both sexual and non-sexual) as well as typologies and
internal contributing factors which lead to deviant behavior. Contraband literature
focused on quantifying the problem as opposed to qualifying it, whereas climate and
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deviance literature applied mostly to non-corrections occupations. The most relevant
discussion of climate-related deviance pertained to use of force and codes of silence
within law enforcement. Therefore, this research contributes to the literature by
exploring the contributions of organizational climate in contraband deviance by
correctional officers within the workplace.
Theoretical Foundation
Ethical climate theory focuses on what is perceived as ethically acceptable within
an organization (Victor & Cullen, 1988). This theory places less emphasis on what is
right or wrong and provides theoretical support for why employees engage in unethical
behavior within the organization. Victor and Cullen (1988) posited that employees may
believe they will be rewarded and supported by the organization if they engage in
behavior that is perceived as personally unethical but accepted within the organization
based on a rewards and punishment system. In other words, if an individual can
somehow identify justification for deviant behavior, he or she is more likely to engage,
regardless of consequences, due to reframing of what constitutes ethical behavior within
his or her particular organization. Further, if certain acts of deviance are tolerated and
not punished with equal veracity, employees are more likely to believe they too will
receive leniency, thus assuming the agency utilizes policies as passive threats unlikely to
be enforced. The tenets of this theory are further affected by gender, age, ethical
development, personality traits, and stage of organizational career (Victor & Cullen,
1988), all relevant factors within correctional facility employment. In addition, theorists
note that social norms, organizational form, and various firm-specific factors would serve
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as dominant antecedents (Victor & Cullen, 1988). In other words, the standards and
factors specific to an organization often dominate the formation of ethics that dictate
behavioral norms among the organization’s members.
With specific relevance to this study, ethical climate theory supported the
inquisition into institutional factors and social dynamics that contribute to active
participation in contraband introduction by correctional officers. Current research has
identified protective factors (i.e., power bases, assignment of ethical responsibility,
administrative support) presumed to minimize individual susceptibility to this type of
deviance. Ethical climate theory supported the research by allowing for exploration of
why the behavior occurs within the correctional setting in the absence of a dichotomous
conceptualization of right and wrong. Instead, this theory clarified the influence of the
development of ethical beliefs and the modification of these beliefs over periods of time
as influenced—specifically as it relates to this research—by stage of organizational
career, gender, ethical education, age, and personality traits. The stage of organizational
career as well as ethical education—which is greatly impacted based on the officer’s age
of entry into the profession and length of career—will be of particular interest to this
study.
Key Concepts in the Literature
Deviance
Throughout the evolution of deviance literature, deviant behavior within the
workplace has been defined and redefined a multitude of ways. In their research on
deviant behavior typologies, Robinson and Bennett (1995) defined employee deviance as
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“voluntary behavior that violates significant organizational norms and in so doing
threatens the well-being of an organization, its members, or both” (p.556), whereas
Friedrichs (2002) conceptualized occupational deviance as self-serving,
counterproductive acts that are in violation of formal and/or informal occupational norms.
Deviancy by organizational standards can involve behaviors that are either ethical or a
violation of policy or jurisdictional law or both (Friedrichs, 2002). Robinson and Bennett
identified four categorical definitions of employee deviance that serve as foundational
classifications within the literature. Production deviance, which is the least serious of all
four categories, is defined as minor, organizationally harmful acts perpetrated by an
employee, whereas property deviance includes acts that are significantly harmful to the
organization (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Acts of deviance committed against another
individual, or interpersonal deviance, also vary in the same severity—minor and
serious—and are identified as either political deviance or personal aggression,
respectively (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Based on their early research, Robinson and
Bennett suggested that future research extrapolate the relevant factors that contribute to
both socially and organizationally motivated deviance in order to better understand this
type of employee-generated problem. As such, many researchers have since answered
the call to contribute to this body of literature by identifying individual, organizational,
and interpersonal factors that are instrumental in the facilitation of workplace deviance.
The prevailing assumption within an organization is that deviant employees are
internally motivated to aggress against their employer. Researchers have identified
perceptually driven antecedents that have strong implications in workplace deviance
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(Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006; Verdorfer, Steinheider, & Burkus, 2015). Judge et al. (2006)
found that employee job attitudes and the social context of the work environment
strongly impact individual propensity towards organizational deviance, whereas
personality and justice perceptions within the workplace influence acts of interpersonal
deviance. Verdorfer et al. (2015) also opined that employee deviance is provoked by
perceptual beliefs created through workplace interactions such as teamwork,
communication, decision-making. The researchers posited that employee cynicism is
moderated by positive work environment and socio-moral climate and as cynicism
increases so does workplace deviance (Verdorfer et al., 2015). Individual factors are
relevant in understanding why employees deviate from organizational norms; however,
research has shown that they are not the only factors worthy of consideration.
The organization itself has some role in the deviancy of its employees and is not
absolved of any degree of liability. Organizational factors such as climate, attitudes,
leadership, and socialization practices (e.g., training, mentorship, and social framing) are
instrumental in the onset of deviant behaviors (Biron, 2010; Ivkovic, 2005; Norman et al.,
2010; Thau et al., 2009). As proffered by Norman et al. (2010), an individual’s ability to
align oneself with the organization impacts that person’s functioning as a successful
employee. Norman et al. studied the implications of organizational identification on
psychological capital (PsyCap), organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB), and
deviance. PsyCap is based on four individual characteristics: self-efficacy, optimism,
hope, and resiliency (Norman et al., 2010). The combination of these four characteristics
contributes to the individual’s conceptualization of self within the organization which in
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turn contributes to behaviors exhibited within the workplace (Norman et al., 2010). The
researchers found that high organizational identity contributed to higher PsyCap, higher
OCBs, and lower deviance (Norman et al., 2010). Norman et al. posited that when the
opposite is true, individuals are more likely to exhibit higher deviancy behaviors.
Additionally, Thau et al. (2009) suggested that employees engage in deviant behaviors as
resolution for negative treatment by superiors (see also Biron, 2010). Biron’s (2010)
findings indicated that employees establish organizational ethics based on actions
demonstrated within the workplace, especially those of superiors, whereas Thau et al.
identified management style as a key component in organizational perceptions of
mistreatment. It is suggested when supervisory support is either neglectful and/or
abusive, employees will resort to reciprocal mistreatment as a way of retaliating against
the organization (Biron, 2010; Thau et al., 2009).
It has been inferred that group dynamics have a significant role in the acceptance
or disapproval of employee deviance (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Farnese et al., 2016;
Ferris, 2009; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). As the moral authority within the
correctional setting, officers have the responsibility of modeling ideal behavior and
positive social reinforcement (Antonio, Young, & Wingeard, 2009). Farnese et al. (2016)
explained that socialization and mentorship serve as reinforcement for organizational
commitment and subsequent deviance deterrence. Further, belongingness and social
alignment are important within any work environment as employees want to feel as
though they have some place in their organization (Farnese et al., 2016; Ferris, 2009).
Ferris (2009) opined that group valuation helps employees develop critical identity
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components and self-esteem within organizations and that members engage in deviance
when organizational and supervisory support in the development of these components are
deficient. On the other hand, some researchers found that group dynamics serve as
catalyst to deviant behaviors in the workplace (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Robinson &
O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly (1998) asserted that negative
workplace behaviors are reinforced through group dynamics based on research into the
socialization in work groups. They found that individual antisocial behaviors mimicked
those of their chosen work group and their experiences became reinforced and heightened
by their desires for deeper alignment with their group (Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly,
1998). Ashforth and Anand (2003) also established socialization as a crucial component
in the normalization of corruption and the perpetuation of deviant behaviors within
organizations. Based on a study of corruption normalization, three components serve as
cornerstones in the normalization process: institutionalization, rationalization, and
socialization. Institutionalization promotes the routinization of corruption and
rationalization legitimizes corrupt acts so that they become socially acceptable (Ashforth
& Anand, 2003). Ashforth and Anand stated that socialization reinforces corruption and
is imparted upon newcomers so that they become indoctrinated into the perpetual cycle.
The current deviance literature provides some insight into individual,
organizational, and within-organizational dynamics that impact employee deviance. The
identification of these factors is helpful to administrators who are invested in the
identification of deviancy markers within their organizations. The concern, however, is
that this literature focuses primarily on non-corrections organizations in which case
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generalizability becomes difficult. Additionally, it does little to address the concerns
associated with contraband introduction among correctional officers. In considering this
type of deviancy in corrections, other factors must also be considered including the
uniqueness of the corrections environment and those who work and live in this setting.
Therefore, an examination of the corrections literature will help provide additional
insights that will guide this research.
Corrections
To understand deviancy among officers, it is important to understand the
environment in which these individuals work. Correctional facilities are strategically
designed to reinforce isolation among offenders from society in the form of physical and
psychological barriers. However, this separation not only impacts the inmate population
housed within the walls of the facilities but also the staff who report to work within the
prisons as well. Prison staff are responsible for the safe and secure daily operations of
the prison facility and must manage the responsibilities of their jobs while also facing the
internal dangers associated with it (Maillicoat, 2005). Scholars agree that the corrections
literature is relatively deficient in providing a thorough examination of deviant behaviors
such as corruption, theft, or sexual assault among correctional officers (Blackburn,
Fowler, Mullings, & Marquart, 2011; Ross, 2013). The current literature highlights
contributory environmental and social factors, possible indicators, as well as
commonalities in deviant officers. While it provides for some understanding into deviant
behaviors among correctional officers through the perspectives of staff as well as
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offenders, the literature is not exhaustive and provides limited insight into a small scope
of the problem.
Prisons are designed to manage individuals who violate societal norms.
Correctional facilities are reflective of the populations that they house ranging from
minimum, medium, maximum, and supermaximum facilities (Maillicoat, 2005).
Offenders are sentenced to prison environments as determined by the severity of their
crimes and the length of their sentences. The policies and rules that govern these
facilities are established by the agency to address the needs of the offender population
while also ensuring public safety. Correctional officers serve as the liaisons between
inmates and organizational management. Because of this, correctional officers are
recognized as the physical embodiment of order and regulation which is necessary for
safe and secure facility management, which is also known as ‘legitimate’ (Steiner &
Wooldredge, 2016). Offender management within prisons is based on theoretical
dominance (Marquart et al., 2001) rather than any other form of domination within the
system as staff are often outnumbered by those under their care. For instance, one
correctional system suggested correctional officers made up 56% of their correctional
workforce at 5,478 members while the inmate population totaled roughly 54,000 for the
2017 fiscal year (Georgia Department of Corrections, 2018). As such, legitimacy among
corrections staff plays an important role in the formation of the theoretical dominance
that permeates within the prison environment. Legitimacy is linked to environmental
stability in prisons which helps minimize discord and chaos among inmates (Steiner &
Wooldredge, 2016). Scholars opined that the rigidity and strictness of the prison
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environment require stability and rule enforcement in order to function safely and
humanely (Garland, Hogan, & Lambert, 2013; Maillicoat, 2005) and the absence or
compromise of legitimacy threatens this stability (Blackburn et al., 2011; Steiner &
Wooldredge, 2016). Legitimacy is most commonly compromised when correctional
officers participate in deviant behaviors within the workplace.
According to a number of researchers, professionalism serves as the ideal
antagonist to corruption and deviance (Shively, 2015; Souryal, 2009; White, 1972);
however, it has done little to curb its growth within correctional departments
domestically and internationally (York, 2016). Deviance in corrections is often identified
as “inappropriate work-related activities which [correctional officers] may engage”
(Ross, 2013, p. 111) which is vague and obscure. Because of this ambiguity, formally
recognized deviant behaviors are loosely classified as: deviance against the institution
(i.e. property theft, failure to perform, leave abuse, and so on), deviance against inmates
(e.g. inappropriate relationships with inmates, abuse of power, excessive force), deviance
against other correctional officers (i.e. contraband introduction, discrimination or
harassment towards coworkers, intoxication while working, and so on) (Henry, 1998;
Ross, 2013). Souryal (2009) identified similar categorizations for correctional officer
deviance with slightly different defining terminology. Nonfeasance are passive acts of
deviance which incorporate omission or avoidance such as failure to report deviant acts
by others or plausible deniability while misfeasance represents acts that are illegitimate
acts committed willingly for personal gain (Souryal, 2009). Malfeasance, on the other
hand, are deviant acts which violate state law and/or organizational policy which includes
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participation in contraband introduction (Souryal, 2009). The inability of researchers to
formalize unanimous guidelines for acts of deviance in corrections lends plausibility to
pertinent concerns.
Correctional literature indicates a number of potential indicators and contributors
to correctional officer deviance which occur as a result of both environmental and social
factors within the correctional setting. The most common types of deviant behaviors
among correctional officers are boundary violations and inappropriate sexual
relationships which often serve as the precursor to contraband introduction (Blackburn et
al., 2011; Worley, 2016). Typically, correctional officers engage in employee deviance
for some sort of personal gain that is either economic or sexual in nature (Blackburn et
al., 2011; Worley, 2016). Correctional officers are at increased susceptibility to deviance
as inmates have an inherent desire to further perpetuate manipulative tactics during
incarceration (Henry, 1998). Shively (2015) asserted that offenders identify target
employees are through perceptual weaknesses such as selective rule reinforcement, role
insecurity, and oversharing of personal problems. However, even though staff are
encouraged to remain cognizant and vigilant while working with inmates and to maintain
clear personal and professional distance in order to resist corruptibility (Ferdick, 2018;
Shively, 2015), some officers still fall victim to deviance.
Coupled with inmate exploitation, high workplace stress, inadequate pay, poor job
satisfaction, and low administrative support have also been cited as some of the most
likely contributors of employee deviance (Donner et al., 2018; Mahfood et al., 2013;
Maillicoat, 2005; Souryal, 2009; Worley & Worley, 2016). Correctional officers are
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faced with an enormous amount of demands from both offenders as well as
administrators. In addition to these demands, high turnover and understaffing force
correctional officers to serve in roles and capacities for which they are often undertrained
or ill-equipped to handle. Maillicoat (2005) highlighted workplace stress as an
occupational mainstay for correctional officers often contributing to role ambiguity and
conflict which other researchers correlated with deviance. Through quantitative selfreport data on job satisfaction and work-related stress, Mahfood et al (2013) found that
uniformed staff identified as being less satisfied with their jobs due to lower perceived
risk. Perceptions of risk are important in corrections as they help correctional officers
remain attune to their environments and heighten their awareness of danger and unrest
among inmates. Similarly, Worley and Worley’s (2016) research on self-reported
correctional officer boundary violations yielded findings which indicated decreased
perception of risk and danger contributed to the onset of boundary violations.
Participants identified insufficient pay and workplace stress as decision-making factors
when considering deviant activities, indicating a negative correlation between stress and
boundary violations on statistical models (Worley & Worley, 2016). In other words, as
work stress decreased for correctional officers, their perception of danger also decreased
and their willingness to participate in deviance increased. Further, increased societal
isolation and self-identification or alignment with inmates further are suggested
justifications for the rationalization of correctional officer boundary violators (Worley &
Worley, 2016).
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As underscored in deviance literature, administrative support impacts the way
correctional officers interact with their work environment. It has been suggested that
supervisory support may have significant impact in officers’ compulsion to participate in
work-related deviance (Garland et al., 2013; Vickovic & Griffin, 2014; Worley &
Worley, 2011, 2013). Through quantitative analysis, Worley and Worley (2011)
described the protective role of support within the correctional work environment as
helping correctional officers cope with perceived deviance among other staff. Their
findings based on correctional officer self-report data suggested that care, especially from
supervisors, creates a gravitational effect among participants who reported lowered
participation in deviant behaviors even if they believed others were behaving
inappropriately (Worley & Worley, 2011). This means employees are more likely to
form bonds that help deter deviant behaviors when they feel as though other staff,
including their supervisors, care about their well-being. Garland et al (2013) also
identified supervisory support as an influential factor in reducing role stress among
correctional officers. Correctional officers reported that job consistency and strong
support from administration—particularly supervisors—helps with the overall
minimization of role stress. Further, supervisory support helps create a reliable coping
mechanism to deal with internal work-related issues (Garland et al., 2013) which is
necessary in stress reduction. Utilizing secondary correctional officer self-report data,
Worley and Worley (2013) later advised that the consequences of poor supervisory
support include general reduction of threat perception, higher perceptions of deviance
among others, and increased justification and participation in employee deviance. In
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other words, correctional officers need the support of their supervisors in order to support
their overall organizational commitment and to reinforce the values needed to avoid
inappropriate workplace behaviors.
Another study utilizing correctional officer survey data also found that
supervisors were more likely to have positive perceptions of their work environment and
were more likely to demonstrate higher levels of affective organizational commitment as
compared to non-supervisory officers (Vickovic & Griffin, 2014). These perceptions
were developed based on organizational justice, beneficial interactions with management,
and appreciation of individual contributions to the organization (Vickovic & Griffin,
2014). The investigators also identified age and gender demographics as mitigating
factors in determining commitment levels among supervisors but not among nonsupervisors, but did not provide specifics regarding these findings (Vickovic & Griffin,
2014). The significance of these findings illustrates the perceptual differences that exist
within an organizational subgroup. Lack of acknowledgement of these differences can
contribute to unnoticed behaviors of retaliation by individuals who feel unappreciated
and undervalued within the organization.
Along with the classification of contributory factors related to correctional
deviance, it is important to also examine possible indicators as well. While some
indicators of deviance may be inherent, most are influenced by the daily conditions
confronted by correctional staff. An examination of the literature provides a significant
listing of important elements of consideration when assessing for employee deviance
(Henry, 1998; Souryal, 2009; Donner et al., 2018). Henry (1998) advised an overall
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mindfulness of staff who demonstrate increased familiarity with inmates, increased
affluence, increased complaints against particular staff, and increased time spent
lingering in the facility when off-duty. While Henry and Souryal (1998) agree that
frequent vocalization of job frustration and unsatisfactory pay, Souryal also opined that
the cyclical facilitation of deviant behavior relies heavily on the continued perpetuation
of conspiratorial-survivalist behaviors which encourage mistrust and decreased
transparency among staff. Souryal also pointed out that structural isolation detaches
officers from the realities of public scrutiny and further reinforces overall desensitization
and perpetuation of the prison industrial complex, all of which have the potential to
fortify justification of deviant behaviors. Interestingly, one study on correctional officers
correlated internal factors such as temperament, impulsiveness, and risky behaviors with
deviancy as well as implicit approval of deviance among others (Donner et al., 2018).
These same indicators, as impacted by job satisfaction and cynicism, have also been
associated with adherence to an inferred ‘code of silence’ (Donner et al., 2018). In some
cases, the aforementioned indicators can be circumvented with proper attention to the
contributory issues. Yet, the reality of the situation suggests that some officers will chose
to engage in deviant workplace behaviors regardless of precautions and discouragement.
Correctional officers who commit deviance within their workplace do so for
various reasons as previously identified. The literature reveals some discrepancy in
regards to where to assign culpability in the initiation of inappropriate staff-offender
relationships (Dial & Worley, 2008; Marquart et al., 2001; Worley, 2016; Worley &
Cheeseman, 2006; Worley et al., 2003; Worley et al., 2010). Some researchers have
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noted that certain institutional factors prelude this breach of trust, yet, disagree on where
to place responsibility for these acts (Dial & Worley, 2008; Marquart et al., 2001).
Correctional officers are placed in a compromising position when dealing with the inmate
population. As such, they are required to rely on offender labor to maintain institutional
functioning, bargain for compliance and submission, and work within close proximity
with inmates (Dial & Worley, 2008; Marquart et al., 2011). This is known as a ‘norm of
reciprocity’ which must exist in order for staff to maintain authority and domination over
inmates in light of the limitations and conditions which exist in the prison setting (Dial &
Worley, 2008; Marquart et al., 2011). However, this norm of reciprocity may also open
the door for corruption among staff members due to the relative increase in familiarity
and decrease in boundary maintenance. Dial and Worley (2008) opined that
understanding the dangers associated with the norm of reciprocity should provide some
insight into the importance of aggressively punishing the obvious culprits—the inmate
violators. On the other hand, Marquart et al (2011) suggested the onus be placed on
employee violators in order to reinforce the significance of social framing and to reiterate
the inappropriateness of boundary violations between staff and inmates. While these
researchers agree on the precariousness of the norm of reciprocity principle in
corrections, they lack agreement in the identification of the instigator.
This inability to agree is present among other corrections researchers throughout
the literature. For instance, Worley et al (2003) analyzed self-report inmate data to
identify types of inmate violators. Three typologies emerged from the data—
heartbreakers, exploiters, and hell-raisers—based on their boundary violation intentions
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(Worley et al., 2003). The researchers suggested that the persistence of the inmates
coupled with their strategic approach to encouraging the boundary breach supports the
inmate-instigator concept (Worley et al., 2003). Worley and Cheeseman (2006) later
supplemented this argument with their research into staff ‘non-sharable problems’ as the
gateway to corruption and offender manipulation. Inmate participants reported careful
selection of staff members who were socially isolated and experiencing personal
problems that they felt they could not share with anyone other than the inmates (Worley
& Cheeseman, 2006). The participants disclosed that the creation of a presumed safe
sharing space allowed them to diminish boundaries between them and the staff member
thereby creating opportunities for manipulation and deviance (Worley & Cheeseman,
2006). Based on the forethought and investment required to selectively target staff
members, inmate violators are the likely antagonists.
Arguably, other researchers have implied employees are the true provocateurs in
these situations. Worley et al (2010) research on boundary violations yielded
consequences of inappropriate staff-offender relationships and identified preventative
measures to avoid these violations. Negative peer relationships, negative staff-inmate
relationships, negative relationships among inmates, and negative repercussions for staff
members were identified by inmate participants as resulting effects of boundary
violations (Worley et al., 2010). Preventative measures included improved supervision
and policy changes directed at employees and the general prison culture (Worley et al.,
2010). Conclusions of this research—based on inmate self-report data—places the
burden of prevention on staff members as opposed to the inmates themselves. Through
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autoethnographical data, Worley (2016) also highlighted the importance of recognizing
the employee’s role in boundary violations but cautioned against the regular practice of
public shaming as prevention. As a former corrections officer, Worley reported on the
regularity of inappropriate relationships in prisons and the importance of how
administrators approach these incidences as they occur. In many cases, officers who are
officially caught in precarious situations with inmates serve as examples for current
employees. The administration often uses these cases for public vilification and
admonishment to deter other employees from participating in deviant behaviors with
inmates (Worley, 2016). However, Worley suggested that these practices may do more
harm than good because they inadvertently reinforce feelings of alienation, isolation, and
sometimes inadequacy as opposed to camaraderie and unity. In other words, the
placement of responsibility on guilty officers is not discouraged; however, administrators
should rethink their responses to deviant behaviors in order to increase prevention
effectiveness.
Other interesting findings emerged throughout the corrections literature that are
worth mentioning. It is important to note that only one study (Worley et al., 2010)
identified sexually inappropriate relationships as the most consequential within the prison
setting, a finding not indicated in other studies included in the current literature. Another
study proffered a specific timeframe of 36 months of initial employment for deviance
onset (Marquart et al. , 2001). Other studies indicate certain demographics such as
Caucasian race (Worley & Worley, 2013) and female gender (Blackburn et al., 2011;
Dial & Worley, 2008) as possible risk variables for deviance participation. Blackburn et
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al. (2011) opined that women were both more likely to participate but less likely to
condone deviant behaviors in corrections (Blackburn et al., 2011). Lower preemployment scoring as well as history of rule violations were also noted as a potential
risk variable (Marquart et al., 2001). It is difficult, however, to ascertain whether
individuals who meet these criteria are more likely than others to participate in deviance
since the implications of these findings lack generalizability as they are not supported
across the literature spectrum.
This literature highlights the overall importance of job conditions and employee
perceptions in countering deviant behaviors in staff. While many forms of deviance exist
in corrections, boundary violations—both sexual and non-sexual—serve as the precursor
to contraband introduction. Without the breach in personal and professional distance,
there would be limited opportunity for manipulation and deviant behaviors. Additionally,
discrepancies in the accountability and acknowledgement of the general severity of
boundary violations as a whole further contributes to the lack of insight into contraband
activity in prisons. Obscurities in defining the problem demonstrates the inherent
complexity of contraband introduction in prisons. Prison administrators struggle to
manage this problem using available data as guidance because of insufficient clarity and
specificity. This study seeks to provide some resolution to these issues.
Contraband Introduction
The scarcity of literature regarding contraband introduction attests to the recency
of interest in studying this problem. Prison contraband is both a domestic and
international problem that has no clearly identified solution (Roth, 2011; York, 2016).
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Stability in prisons is a critical factor in safety and security management which is why it
is reiterated across various areas of prison research, including contraband literature. For
years, contraband literature reflected the viewpoint that contraband was a necessary evil
in stability maintenance because contraband contributes to perceived autonomy and
provides resolution to the inherent deprivations associated with incarceration (Kalinich &
Stojkovic, 1985; Grommon et al., 2018). Kalinich and Stojkovic (1985) studied the
impact of contraband on power dynamics and legitimacy within correctional settings and
opined that contraband was beneficial to both staff and inmates in regard to the overall
stability of the prison social structure. Contraband markets—which include inaccessible
items and items not approved by the correctional administration such as cellphones,
drugs, weapons, gambling paraphernalia, currency, and other goods—allow inmates to
feel as though they have retained some power and are manipulating the system while also
allowing staff to sustain their overarching power within the system by facilitating a
system selective punishment which heightens demand and sustains the need for the
contraband market (Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985; CAPI, 2016). As stated earlier, the
introduction of these items often comes as a result of boundary violations in the form of
inappropriate sexual or non-sexual relationships. However, it has been suggested that the
development of interpersonal relationships between staff and inmates is necessary for the
development of bonds necessary to help support the internal power structure that exists
between staff and inmates (Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985). Kalinich and Stojkovic noted
that while contraband allows for environmental stability, it also endorses increased
secrecy and deviancy among both staff and inmates and creates and unsustainable system

38
of management. In other words, the formation of inappropriate relationships and the
silent exploitation of the contraband markets by staff were seemingly beneficial to prison
administrators until they were no longer manageable.
Over the past few decades, the research in contraband has shifted from the belief
that contraband markets support the power structure within prison settings and assist
administrators with the maintenance of stability to the understanding that contraband
introduction produces dangerous and widespread consequences for those involved (Burke
& Owen, 2010; CAPI, 2016; Grommon et al., 2018; Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985; Roth,
2011; York, 2016). While earlier contraband literature attributes the utility of the
contraband market with maintaining prison stability and overall functioning (Kalinich &
Stojkovic, 1985), other researchers have evolved the literature to reflect the dangers
associated with contraband introduction in correctional settings. York (2016) inferred the
potential for injuries and death in prison are more often than not associated with
contraband introduction or inappropriate relationships while other researchers noted the
risk to public safety also associated (Grommon et al., 2018). In the hierarchy of prison
contraband, cellphones are big ticket items because they allow inmates to remain
connected to the outside world and continue their criminal activities while incarcerated.
The contraband system provides a cycle of wealth for participants which is the top
priority for those within the inmate population and correctional officers are often enticed
by the allure of substantially supplementing their income regardless of the associated
risks and dangers (York, 2016). Not surprisingly, poor compensation has been associated
with contraband smuggling as correctional officers can earn anywhere from $100-$1000
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per phone which can significantly improve wage disparities (Burke & Owen, 2010;
CAPI, 2016). According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018), the 2017 annual wage for
correctional officers was $43,510 which was 9% below the national per capita average.
An official 2016 audit reported the starting salary for entry-level Georgia Department of
Corrections correctional officers as $24,322 with a proposed increase to $27,936 during
the 2017 fiscal year (Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, 2016). Based on this
apparent income discrepancy, it is easy to see the allure of substantial income
supplementation.
Deviant officers involved in the contraband market are typically confronted with
outcomes such as termination and/or legal repercussions (including fines, probation,
incarceration, or any combination of these; York, 2016). The ramifications of contraband
introduction are constantly reiterated and displayed as incessant reminder for anyone with
any interactions with prisoners. Yet, even with the threat of a guaranteed negative
outcome, some correctional officers still succumb to manipulation and deviance. York’s
review provided the first indication in this literature of the existence of a potential “thin
blue line” and the silent reinforcement of a “code of silence” (para. 18) as explanation for
why officers choose to engage in contraband introduction. York suggested that a
subculture of loyalty—similar to police organizations—exists among correctional officers
and this subculture inadvertently perpetuates deviance among officers. York also
credited this subculture with underreporting of corruption by supervisors even though the
expectation of reporting deviance is placed on all members of the organization. In
accordance with York, the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity at Columbia
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Law School (CAPI, 2016) also suggested that supervisors provide certain protections by
covering up the deviant behaviors of other staff members. Obstructive acts such as these
not only impair investigation attempts but also interfere with accessing accurate
contraband data.
Researchers agree that contraband introduction is a widespread problem;
however, they have been unable to accurately specify the scope of this quandary within
corrections. At the time of this research, Grommon et al (2018) provided the only
quantitative data set reflective of contraband cell phones in prisons. Grommon et al.’s
(2018) study on confiscation totals revealed the discrepancies between internal
confiscation data and cellphone availability in prisons. The researchers analyzed data
from a prison facility which utilizes a managed access system—which filters the cell
transmissions of authorized and unauthorized cellphones—and compared it to
confiscation totals (Grommon et al., 2018). Findings indicated cellphone availability was
twice as high as cellphone confiscation totals at a rate of 5 to 19 (available) per 1
confiscated phone (Grommon et al., 2018). This research further solidifies the position
that the availability of accurate data is necessary in understanding the scope of cellphone
contraband introduction.
It is worth mentioning that job dissatisfaction and low hiring standards are also
identified as possible contributory factors specifically related to contraband introduction
(York, 2016). Poor education was also mentioned as having possible correlation with
contraband introduction (CAPI, 2016). However, neither of these were heavily supported
across the data. As demonstrated, contraband literature is fairly recent with most having
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occurred within the last decade. The research available exhibits a limited breadth of
understanding in the impact of contraband introduction on non-participants. Differing
from deviance literature and corrections literature, minimal information is provided in
specific traits or characteristics associated with this particular act of deviance. Few
contributory or indicative factors that are specifically applicable to contraband
introduction have been identified in the literature thus far. The limited availability of
data in this area affirms the need for additional research that will help provide greater
understanding into this area of concern.
Climate
The climate of an organization attests to the interactions between the principles of
the organization and its employees. At the time of this research, the climate literature—
similar to the deviance literature—is heavily influenced by non-corrections related
literature and there is very little mention of climate within the corrections literature.
However, it is beneficial to understand how an organization’s climate relates to the
problems that plague the environment. This is especially true in corrections as the
organizational climate may have a significant impact on how employees interact with
their organizational environment and the choices that are made based on those
interactions. The climate literature provides insight into the establishment of
organizational climate and the importance of climate in employee behavior.
The concept of organizational climate centers on the individual’s perspective—
including attitudes, experiences, and descriptions—regarding his or her place of
employment (Ivkovic, 2005; Schneider et al., 2013). The organizational climate can
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determine how people interact within their work environment and elicit certain
behavioral responses based on these interactions (Taxman et al., 2008). Climate is a
critical factor in correctional officer job performance within the prison setting (Lugo,
2016). The development of ethical climate research stems from the need to understand
the influence of morality in ethical workplace decision-making. Early moral
development research highlighted the influence of education and social exposure in
cognitive reasoning and cognitive processing relative to problem-solving (Kohlberg &
Hersh, 1977). Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) emphasized the need to consider the impacts
of individual choices on all members who may be affected by those choices instead of
reasoning from a solely self-serving perspective as the foundation for moral judgment.
The researchers opined that while moral judgment serves an important function in moral
development, it is often not enough to constitute moral action (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977).
As an extension of this, Victor and Cullen (1988) assessed the organizational
characteristics, or climates, that either influence or discourage individual moral action
among employees. Of the five identified climate dimensions, caring climates are most
preferred by employees and significantly influence ethical decision-making on an
individual level within organizations (Victor & Cullen, 1988). The researchers opined
that climate variation within organizations is not uncommon as organizational subunits
have their own climates which may be in alignment or opposition to the general
organizational climate (Victor & Cullen, 1988). However, the presence of a caring
climate within an organization increases employee fit and belongingness which heightens
individual consideration for others and increases moral reasoning during ethical
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dilemmas (Victor & Cullen, 1988). It has been suggested that employee-focused mission
statements may assist with influencing the development of a caring climate by
establishing the guidelines which foster community among workers (Vidaver-Cohen,
1998). Therefore, the development of a caring climate within an organization may serve
as a deterrent for deviant staff behaviors.
Climate plays a significant role in determining organizational commitment among
employees (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Schwepker, 2001; Trevino, Butterfield, & McCabe,
1998). For example, one study explored the relationship between contextual ethical
factors (climate and culture) and ethically-motivated attitudes and behaviors in the form
of commitment and observed unethical behavior, respectively (Trevino et al., 1998).
Based on participants’ responses, self-interest and egoism climate dimensions were
identified in positive association with unethical conduct while the law and code
dimension was associated with a reduction in observed unethical behaviors (Trevino et
al., 1998). The findings also indicate that the combination of climate and culture have
strong influences on ethical decision-making as employees will model the behaviors and
examples set by ethical leaders within the organizational context (Trevino et al., 1998).
Results of this study also indicated a positive association between employee- and
community-focused climates and organizational commitment (Trevino et al., 1998), in
support of Victor and Cullen’s earlier findings. This study was unique due to the fact that
it measured both the influences of both ethical climate and ethical culture in one study in
order to highlight distinctions between the two constructs and the influences of both on
employee commitment. Schwepker (2001) later emphasized the importance of the
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creation of an ethical climate in order to strengthen organizational commitment, enhance
employee fit, and decrease turnover. Ethical climate encourages rule reinforcement,
organizational justice, and ethical activity through the implementation of policies and
procedures, and codes of ethics (Schwepker, 2001). Schwepker found that the overall
establishment of an ethical climate within an organization reinforces employee
satisfaction and commitment and discourages turnover intent because it emphasizes the
importance of ethical action and minimizes ethical ambiguity. The researcher highlighted
the application of this study to one particular population—salespeople—due to their
social isolation within the organization (Schwepker, 2001). This similarity provides for
increased generalizability to correctional officers because of the same social isolation
they experience, albeit on a larger scale, as part of their occupation. Similar to these
studies, Martin and Cullen (2006) also surmised that employees engage in behaviors that
reflect implicit decision-making guidelines as established by the ethical climate. In the
presence of caring climates, employees who feel appreciated and valued within the
organization will reciprocate this treatment with loyalty and trustworthiness (Martin &
Cullen, 2006). Conversely, when employees feel the climate reflects the best interest of
the organization and the organization emphasizes individual self-advancement for the
sake of the organization, they will resort to organizational deviance in retaliation (Martin
& Cullen, 2006). Employee behavior, therefore, is a reflection of their perceived
treatment within their organization and can serve as a benefit or a detriment to the
organization.
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Correctional facilities utilize policies and procedures for offender management
and departmental functioning but these policies are not employee- or community-focused
and may not provide sufficient ethical guidance in light of growing concerns with
employee deviance. Instead, one might consider the dominate climate in corrections as
falling within the rules and regulations dimension which has its limitations in ethical
reinforcement. One study conducted in an industrial setting explored climate perceptions
and organizational misbehavior based of self-report data by supervisors and employees
(Vardi, 2001). Based on this data, respondents reported that organizational misbehavior
is contingent upon the prevailing ethical climate and is manifested as both covert and
overt acts aimed at various targets within the organization including productivity,
property, coworkers, or the organization (Vardi, 2001). Vardi also found that the
organizational climate—identified as rules and regulations within this particular
organization—prioritized the needs of the organization over employees which often
fosters an atmosphere of deviance among employees. Interestingly, the study also
highlighted interpersonal differences in climate perception as managers reported climate
from a more positive perspective than employees (Vardi, 2001). The findings associated
with this study suggest that rule-dominated climates may not be the answer in regulating
deviant employee behaviors. Another study assessed the salience of emotionality in
ethical decision-making among employees and found that guilt and shame serve as the
primary factors for eliciting ethical and unethical behaviors, respectively (Trevino et al.,
2006). The study assessed the differences between those who apply ‘means’ (or
formalists) versus ‘ends’ (or utilitarians) during problem assessment and the emotional
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processing that drives the behavioral responses to these ethical dilemmas. Trevino et al
(2006) noted that adult conceptualization of right and wrong is largely influenced by two
forms of thinking: whether the means justifies the action or whether the end result
justifies the action. While both formalists and utilitarians regarded moral issues as those
involving some type of harm, utilitarians were less likely to recognize violations of
behavioral norms as moral issues which significantly impacted their decision-making
regarding deviant behaviors (Trevino et al. 2006). In other words, individuals who are
motivated by the end-result are less likely to recognize deviant behaviors as harmful
because it does not compute as such in their problem identification process if the end
result is somehow beneficial. External social factors such as climate, culture,
consideration for others, peer and leadership modeling, organizational justice, and
rewards also influenced ethical decision-making and play a role in behavior management
(Trevion et al., 2006). The role of climate as an informal regulator in employee
behavioral management deems it worthy of organizational attention when confronting
deviancy in the work environment. Findings of this study indicated individuals who
experience guilt were more likely to resolve moral dilemmas with ethical behavior
because of the possible infliction of harm on others while individuals who experience
shame were more likely to respond with unethical behaviors in order to deter selfinflicted pain (Trevino et al., 2006). The emotional guidelines associated with behavioral
responses are also further reinforced by climate factors such as employee-focused versus
organization-focused climate considerations as previously established in earlier climate
research. Trevino et al. (2006) also opined that both individuals with internal loci of
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control and women have increased sensitivity in identifying ethical issues, a finding not
mentioned in other related studies. Interestingly, the researchers noted that older
employees or employees with longer tenure presented with lower moral judgment scores
(Trevino et al., 2006, see also Victor & Cullen, 1988). This finding suggests the
possibility of increased desensitization to unethical behaviors in those with longer job
history, which was later reiterated in research on whistleblowing behaviors and ethics
perceptions among supervisors.
Researchers have also identified tenure as having a significant impact on ethical
reporting behaviors in law enforcement (Dennehy & Nantel, 2006; Rothwell & Baldwin,
2007). These bodies of research represent a limited group of literature that explains
climate considerations within law enforcement professions. Dennehy and Nantel (2006)
concurred that camaraderie amongst corrections officers created an “us versus them”
mentality that reinforced the code of silence principle. The code of silence discouraged
reporting of misconduct and also implicitly endorsed unethical behavior due to the
diminished risk of reporting and associated disciplinary sanction (Dennehy & Nantel,
2006). This suggests that correctional climate within the correctional setting allows the
code of silence to reign supreme when it is not employee-focused and prioritizes
organizational needs over the safety and concern of staff. Further, when correctional
climates are left unchecked and deviant behavior is not addressed both officers and
offenders react accordingly. Dennehy and Nantel opined that uniform accountability of
staff is necessary for overall climate management and improvement. Additionally,
Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) described policing as an organization adhering to the law
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and code climate in which case officers base ethical decisions off of what they are taught
in trainings and field supervision. It is important to note that ethical dilemmas not
addressed through these forms of instruction are often decided based on discretion and
individual information processing. As such, some officers engage in unethical behaviors
during employment which forces other officers to either accept or report the behavior.
Reporting employee misconduct, known as whistleblowing, is often discouraged among
officers and even though failure to do so is unlawful (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). The
results of Rothwell and Baldwin’s research indicated an employee-focused climate—
friendship or team climate—as positively related to willingness to report misconduct;
however, this same climate counteracted willingness to report amongst longer tenured
employees. That is, police officers who feel a sense of community and belongingness
may be more willing to report misconduct as a means of positively addressing the wellbeing of fellow officers. Yet, older or more established officers may be less willing to
report others in the same climate due to their sense of camaraderie and loyalty to one
another. Rothwell and Baldwin also implied that longer-serving officers may have
increased exposure to deviant behaviors among coworkers and refrain from reporting in
accordance with feelings of cynicism and despondence towards the organization.
Other researchers have analyzed the effects of ethical climate on employee
deviance (Chen, Chen, & Liu, 2013; Trevino, Weaver, & Brown, 2008; Hsieh & Wang,
2016). Trevino et al. (2008) posited that social identification contributed to
organizational identity, one’s feelings towards the organization, and possible unethical
behavioral responses to organizational problems. Individuals who felt detached from
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their organization were likely to develop feelings of cynicism and perceived
organizational ethics as less favorable (Trevino et al., 2008). The findings also indicated
that supervisors were more likely to relate to the organization and have increased positive
perceptions towards their organization in comparison to non-supervisors (Trevino et al.,
2008). Further, supervisors were also more likely to recognize the ethical climate of the
organization as both positive and supportive of employee reporting behaviors during
ethical concerns whereas employees perceive the opposite to be true (Trevino et al.,
2008). Non-supervisory employees in this study were more likely to perceive the ethical
climate as one that was organization-focused and motivated to conceal deviant behaviors
for the benefit of the organization (Trevino et al., 2008). This is suggestive of the
possibility that the separation in rank between employees and supervisors not only creates
a physical divide but also alters the perceptual realities of each groups’ interactions with
the work environment. Employees may be more likely to feel emotionally detached from
their organization which may provide subconscious justification for active or passive
participation in deviant activities. Chen et al. (2013) also investigated the role of
negative emotional experiences and employee deviance and found that employees who
have negative emotional experiences related to their job reported a higher propensity to
engage in workplace deviance. Additionally, results indicated specific ethical climates
contributed to negative affectivity (NA) and deviance. Chen et al. (2013) reported the
significance of an instrumental climate in reinforcing negative affectivity and increased
employee deviance while a caring climate contributed to positive affectivity and
decreased deviance. In other words, employees are likely to utilize emotional
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experiences to make sense of their work environment and react according to those
experiences. Hsieh and Wang (2016) also determined that perceived ethical climate
informs decision-making relative to organizational deviance. Similar to Chen et al.’s
study (2013), participants in this study processed work-related ethical dilemmas on an
individual-level through cognitive, emotional, and attitudinal reasoning (Hsieh & Wang,
2016). As part of this process, perceived ethical climate assisted with individual-level
processing based on previous organizational interactions and helped employees
determine whether or not to engage in organizational deviance (Hsieh & Wang, 2016).
Findings also suggested job satisfaction as demonstrating a moderative effect on PEC and
subsequent OD (see also Schwepker, 2001). Therefore, it is inferred that positive
perceived ethical climate is reflective of positive organizational interactions which
decreases individual-level propensity to engage in organizational deviance.
As presented in other areas of the literature, socialization is an important factor in
the development and sustenance of organizational climate. Organizational socialization
provides reinforcement of formal and informal practices for both new and seasoned
employees, which is especially important for corrections staff as they adjust to their roles
and social seclusion (Farnese et al., 2016). As previously reported, deviance in
corrections occurs at a much higher rate than data can account for which places a number
of employees in a position of dissonance regarding decision-making such as
whistleblowing, active or passive participation, attrition, and so on (Robinson &
O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). Ashforth and Anand (2003) suggested this dissonance is
necessary in corruption deterrence as it encourages non-deviant officers to identify an
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appropriate response that demonstrates acceptance or denial of such behaviors. However,
not everyone is prompted by the discomfort that emerges from moral awareness to
engage in counter-deviant behaviors. In their study of unethical behavior and
organizational systems, Martin, Kish-Gephart and Detert (2013) opined that in some
positive ethical climates a narrow focus on facilitating ethical behaviors within the
organization inadvertently allows some unethical behavior to go unnoticed and
unaddressed. The organizational members then choose to engage in unethical behaviors
through cognitive distortion and irrational justification (Martin et al., 2013). Similar to
Trevino et al.’s (2006) findings, Martin et al. (2013) implied that this rationalization is
based on the ability to satisfy self-serving means through unethical actions with little
consideration for the widespread effects. Poor accountability for unethical behaviors
further espouses deviant activity even if the organizational climate discourages such
behaviors because participants are able to justify their actions in a way that decreases
their internal discomfort. This has the potential to reach others through group identity
and increased desires for social alignment. Another study of non-corrections
professionals noted that group relatability and group identity were reinforced through
positive ethical climates (Goldman & Tabak, 2010). Further the interactions facilitated
through these group dynamics encouraged interpersonal considerations and supported
group benevolence—a deterrent of deviant employee behaviors (Goldman & Tabak,
2010). Additionally, scholars highlighted the importance of belongingness in behavioral
regulation noting an apparent deviation from internal moral standards when confronted
with group standards of morality (Pagliaro, Presti, Barattucci, Giannella, & Barretto,
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2018). The findings indicated that participants were more likely to select behavioral
responses that were reflective of the organizational climate while also in consideration of
their group alignment (Pagliaro et al., 2018). Self-interest climates were more likely to
elicit responses that resulted from moral disengagement and encouraged deviance while
friendship climates, like caring climates, were more likely to elicit feelings of
belongingness and deter deviant responses (Pagliaro et al., 2018). This is an important
consideration as group assimilation and alignment are predominate socialization
dynamics within prisons and among corrections officers. While individuals are
responsible for the development of their personal moral character, this research has
demonstrated the counteractive effects of group dynamics in the enactment of moral
standards within the workplace.
Organizational climate also informs decision-making regarding deviant workplace
behaviors. This literature has explained that decision-making among employees is
predominately based on emotional responses to ethical situations. Employees formulate
responses to deviance based on how they feel about the organization, their social group
within the organization, and their perceptions of how the organization and social groups
feel towards them. It is apparent that moral calibration outside of employment is often
diminished or completely disregarded when faced with ethical concerns within their
organization. As a result, it is important for organizations to consider the type of climate
that is fostered and how that climate is perceived by employees in order to confront
issues regarding deviance. This literature, however, was not thoroughly representative of
law enforcement or corrections and still left unanswered questions. The literature does
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not provide explanations for climate considerations in regard to serious deviance such as
contraband introduction. The literature also does not provide insight into how officers
perceive the organizational climate following exposure of contraband introduction.
Summary
The current literature provided general insight into deviance, corrections,
contraband introduction, and the influence of climate within the organization. Both
deviance and climate literature highlighted the influence of organizational and social
factors that contribute to deviance within the workplace. The majority of these studies
reflected non-corrections populations which created concerns regarding generalizability
of results for this unique population. Additionally, the climate literature was heavily
supported by research that addressed the impact of emotionality in ethical problemsolving. The corrections and contraband introduction literatures established economic
and interpersonal concerns as the factors most likely to contribute to correctional officer
deviance. However, consideration for the consistency of these factors across all
demographics did not fully substantiate these as causal influences in this form of officer
deviance. Neither body of research presented perceptual data of officers who have dealt
with the residual effects of contraband introduction by fellow officers and the concerns
that come along with awareness of such behavior by other officers. This body of research
attempted to resolve this gap through the qualitative exploration of officer perspectives as
described in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perspectives of
correctional officers (of all rankings) who have experienced contraband introduction by
other security staff. This chapter provides an overview of the research design, the
purpose in this particular design selection, as well as the role of the researcher. This
chapter also highlights participant recruitment and selection, data collection, and data
analysis. Ethical concerns and methodological rigor are also addressed in the contents of
this chapter, which segues into the study’s findings as presented in chapter four.
Research Design and Rationale
Research questions regarding correctional officer contraband introduction and
climate influence were developed based on the identified problem statement and purpose
of the study.
Central question: How do cellphone contraband violations by correctional officers
impact the perceptions of other correctional officers regarding cellphone
contraband prevention in state prisons?
SQ1: How does correctional climate encourage contraband introduction by
correctional officers?
SQ2: How does the correctional climate impact reporting of contraband
violators by non-complicit officers?
These questions arose as a result of the need to explore perspectives regarding
cellphone contraband introduction by correctional officers and understand the impact the
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decision to participate in this particular form of deviance has on non-participatory
officers. I used a transcendental phenomenological study to highlight key concepts
relative to the lived experiences of those with previous exposure to cellphone contraband
introduction. Transcendental phenomenology focuses more on descriptions of
participants’ experiences as opposed to the interpretations of the researcher (Moustakas,
1994). The expectation was that the participants’ experiences would produce themes that
would enhance the current knowledge associated with this concept. Through this study I
was able to assess how cellphone contraband introduction impacts officers’ perceptions
of the organization, the work environment, social interactions, and reporting behaviors. I
was also able to inquire into the factors (e.g. organizational, environmental, and social)
that influence ethical decision-making regarding participation and reporting deviant
activities.
Role of the Researcher
As the researcher in this study, I served in the capacity of observer in order to
present the perspectives of participants based on their lived experiences. I did not
observe in the traditional sense but served as an interviewer documenting the experiences
of those who had some direct experience with the phenomenon of interest. After
reviewing the descriptions provided by the participants, I identified themes relevant to the
phenomenon of study and reported findings based on this information. I had no prior
personal relationships with any of the participants involved in the study. Although I had
minimal prior experience with the phenomenon of interest as a former corrections
employee, this experience was not similar to that experienced by corrections officers.
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Moustakas (1994) recommends bracketing—or epoché, which is a process of identifying
and blocking out personal biases associated with the phenomenon of interest prior to
commencement of research interviews—to ensure that my personal experiences would
not interfere with my objectivity.
Methodology
Participant Selection Logic
I initially anticipated identifying correctional officers throughout one southeastern
state as participants for this study. To achieve this, I utilized a specific type of purposeful
sampling—criterion sampling—to identify research participants. Criterion sampling
allows for the utilization of information-rich cases that meet some criterion as established
by the nature of the research (Palinkas et al., 2015). Specifically, criterion-i sampling
allows for the identification and selection of participants based on predetermined
criterion of importance as opposed to criterion-e sampling, which focuses on the selection
of outlier cases that do not fall within the identified criterion (Palinkas et al., 2015). The
identified research questions indicated the use of criterion-i sampling as most appropriate
in the strategical selection of research participants who could provide rich, useful data.
The criteria for participation in this particular study were
•

tenure—at least 24 months post-law enforcement certification (peace or
sworn) employment as a correctional officer, and

•

exposure—knowledge of at least one incident involving contraband
introduction into the facility during current tenure. This knowledge may come
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as secondary information provided following the incident from other officers
or supervisors.
Beginning December 19, 2019 , I circulated a general announcement that included
my contact information and requested voluntary participation in the study. Voluntary
participants who contacted me were subsequently screened according to the
predetermined criterion and selected based on fit. Initially, I sought a range of eight to 10
officers for interview to reflect on their experiences with contraband introduction
exposure during their tenure. This range was identified due to the detail-oriented nature
of the study and the general recommendation of smaller sample sizes in qualitative
inquiry by previous scholars. Dukes (1984) and Riemen (1986) both suggested no more
than 10 individuals for a phenomenological study in order to ensure that the researcher
pays adequate attention to detail in documenting the lived experiences of participants (as
cited in Creswell, 2013). This smaller sample size allowed for greater saturation of data
as I was able to spend more time extrapolating information from participants that was
fully reflective of their experience with contraband introduction in their profession. The
recollections of these experiences were then used to detail the phenomenon in a way that
was reflective of the impacts of contraband introduction.
Instrumentation
This study incorporated an interview protocol (see Appendix A) for data
collection in response to all stated research questions. The interview protocol was not a
duplicate of previous interview protocols and was developed by me. The interview
protocol consisted of semistructured, open-ended questions that encouraged in-depth
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reflection of personal experiences relevant to contraband introduction. The interview
questions were developed as an extension of the central research question and also
reflected the identified sub-questions. The framing of the protocol questions related
directly to the underlying theoretical foundation and elicited responses that described the
phenomenon relative to ethical climate theory. The development of interview questions
based on both the research question and the application of ethical climate theory ensured
the elicited data was reflective of the phenomenon.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
Participants were allowed to decide on an interview format—in-person or video
conference—that was not cumbersome for the them. I reminded participants that their
voluntary participation was not an extension of their employment and not subject to
review by their employer. This was done to ensure participants were interviewed as
private citizens without oversight by the department. The participant interviews were
conducted solely by me. The interview process occurred only once and was expected to
last no more than 1 hour 45 minutes. Interviews were recorded via audio recorder, which
I tested for accuracy and functionality prior to the interview. A backup audio recorder
was also used in the event of malfunction of the primary recorder. In the event that I
would not able to secure enough participants through the original recruitment method,
participants would be asked to provide two additional participant referrals in order to
identify additional individuals who met the predetermined criteria and were willing to
participate in this study. At the conclusion of each interview, I debriefed the participants
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by providing basic information regarding the nature of the study, allowing for questions
or concerns on behalf of the participant, and reiterating confidentiality measures.
Data Analysis Plan
Phenomenological data analysis was used to process and analyze the data
collected. I transcribed the collected data myself to ensure accuracy in textual
construction of interview data. Following transcription, I identified significant statements
in the transcripts in a process called horizonalization (see Moustakas, 1994). These
significant statements serve as textual representations of the participants’ experiences
relevant to the phenomenon of interest. Horizonalization produced clusters of meaning
that highlighted the significant themes presented in the data. I identified initial codes
based on the horizonalization data and later recoded this data to determine consistencies
and inconsistencies in themes, at which time relevant textural and structural descriptions
emerged as data references. Textural descriptions are written descriptions of the
participants’ experiences as reflected in the statements and themes identified from the
data, whereas structural descriptions provide contextual value to these experiences by
also incorporating relevant situational influences as indicated by these themes and
statements (Moustakas, 1994). The difference between these descriptions is that textural
descriptions reflect what was experienced while structural descriptions reflect how the
phenomenon was experienced. Both descriptions were used to establish the essence (i.e.,
the shared experiences of the participants) of the phenomenological study.
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Issues of Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness—credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability—
was established through a number of practices throughout the initial stages of this study.
I clarified any pre-existing biases through epoché—or bracketing—in order to block out
any predetermined judgments and substantiate researcher objectivity. I also clarified the
existence and impacts of any previous experiences and prejudices relative to the
phenomenon of interest, which helped minimize the influence of any subjective
interpretations. The participant selection process also helped reaffirm trustworthiness
through variation in participant selection. The two primary criteria—tenure and
exposure—were used to vet potential participants. Other demographic information such
as age, gender, race, and socioeconomic status were not applied as selection criteria in
order to maintain heterogeneity in the sample. This allowed for the application of a
variety of perspectives with the expectation that this sample would be reflective of the
correctional officer population. Throughout the research process, I maintained a
reflective journal for the disclosure of private reflections that could have produced undue
influence on the study. Following the initial coding process, I undertook a code-recode
procedure to confirm the dependability of the results. Additionally, member checking
assisted with confirming my interpretations of the data in order to safeguard the
credibility of the research. For this step, participants who elected to review the data
analysis were contacted and provided with an opportunity to identify any interpretation
inaccuracies.
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Ethical Procedures
For ethical considerations, the experiences and reflections of the participants were
not a reflection of the organization for which they work. Participants were attesting to
their experiences within their professional capacity and were not speaking on behalf of
the department. Participants were more likely to withhold information or speak in terms
that positively reflected the agency if they were subjected to study participation on-site.
In an attempt to secure authenticity in participant responses, I opted to interview officers
as private citizens. Therefore, the participant recruitment and study commencement did
not take place at any particular worksite or through participation with any department of
corrections. I also informed participants that their responses and participation were
voluntary and independent of their employers. The content of the interview was
reflective of the officers’ lived experiences with the phenomenon itself. Further, I
encouraged the participants not to speak on behalf of the department and to speak
specifically in regard to their personal experiences with exposure to cellphone contraband
introduction. I obtained permission from the Walden University Institutional Review
Board (approval # 12-17-19-0525989) to conduct a study involving human subjects prior
to recruitment and additional investigation efforts. I anticipated no harm and very
minimal (if any) risk to the participants, which was consistent throughout the research
process. Recruitment efforts ensured the anonymity of study participants who contacted
me to express participation interest based on their review of the recruitment
announcement placed on various social media platforms including LinkedIn, Facebook,
and Twitter. Initial contact with participants provided them with an overview of the
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purpose of study and their role as participants. I provided participants with informed
consent forms, which they had the option to sign, and an opportunity to ask questions or
raise concerns regarding their participation. Participants were informed that the data
related to this study would be shared with necessary members of the research committee
and that final results would be provided for participants’ review. I remained mindful
during the interview process of sharing information that could bias or encourage false
reporting by participants. This research incorporated anonymity to promote participants’
comfort in participation. I also protected participants’ identities by developing composite
profiles in order to respect privacy concerns. In order to avoid one-sided findings, I have
reported all perspectives relative to the study’s findings. When confronted with early
withdrawals or participation refusals, I incorporated a referral process in order to seek out
additional participants. Refusals and withdrawals were documented as part of the
findings in the study in order to maintain trustworthiness and transparency in the study.
Electronic data has been stored on an encrypted external drive which has been placed in a
locked file safe. If necessary, physical copies of documentation (such as forms requiring
signatures) would be scanned to the electronic drive and physical copies would also be
placed in the locked file safe for data security and storage. Additionally, these physical
copies would be stored and filed separate from research data with the university’s
research department. The data related to this study will be stored for a period of no less
than 5 years following study completion.
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Summary
The concepts outlined in this chapter highlighted the process by which this study
explored the perspectives of correctional officers exposed to contraband introduction.
The research design, rationale, and researcher role provided the foundation on which the
current study was based. The methodology included the steps that were incorporated to
further identify viable participants and data collection and analysis procedures. Concerns
related to trustworthiness and ethicality of the study process were also discussed at
length. Chapter 4 presents the findings related to the study as established in this chapter.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The understanding of correctional officer perspectives on cellphone contraband
introduction by fellow officers was central to this particular study. Through interview
questioning, I sought answers to the following questions: How do cellphone contraband
violations by correctional officers impact the perceptions of other correctional officers
regarding cellphone contraband prevention in state prisons? How does correctional
climate encourage cellphone contraband introduction by correctional officers? How does
the correctional climate impact reporting of contraband violators by non-complicit
officers? This chapter provides details related to the data collection and data analysis
processes as well as the final results, which will be interpreted in the final chapter of this
study.
Setting
In accordance with the recruitment process described in the previous chapter, a
recruitment announcement was circulated on various social media platforms including
LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter on December 19, 2019. The conditions of the study
were as expected in regard to working with individuals in law enforcement. Only one
participant mentioned specific influential organizational conditions present within the
department that could have contributed to decreased participation. This participant
reported organizational downsizing due to budget cuts and stated that a number of
employees throughout the organization were concerned with job stability and security.
This departmental shift could have discouraged participation if employees believed the
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organization would find out about their participation and use it against them. Because this
information was provided early in the study, I took it into consideration during the
remainder of the recruitment process.
Overall, I experienced some difficulty in securing voluntary participants from the
targeted area of the study. In response to this obstacle, I attempted to secure referrals
from participants identified in both the recruitment process as well as those who
participated in data collection. However, this still did not generate additional participants
who were willing to provide data for this research. Based on these factors, I opted to
collect and analyze data based on the available participants.
Demographics
Approximately 14 individuals initially contacted me about participating in the
study. For the purposes of this study, all 14 will be considered participants as they all
scheduled interviews with me with the intent of participating in the data collection
process. The demographics of the overall participant pool were variant, and demographic
information relevant to this study was provided during pre-screen interactions. These
relevant demographics included rank, length of tenure, age, and gender (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Demographic Data: Initial Recruitment Sample
Participant
Participant 1
Participant 2
Participant 3
Participant 4
Participant 5
Participant 6
Participant 7
Participant 8

Age
39
59
28
32
42
47
52
50

Gender
F
F
M
M
F
M
F
F

Tenure
7 years
28 years
6 years
10 years
16 years
19 years
20 years
27 years

Rank
Correctional Officer II
Correctional Officer II
Lieutenant
Captain
Lieutenant
Correctional Officer II
Correctional Officer II
Sergeant

Participant 9
Participant 10
Participant 11
Participant 12
Participant 13
Participant 14

32
35
39
47
33
35

F
F
F
F
M
M

4 years
4 years
10 years
13 years
5 years
3 years

Correctional Officer II
Sergeant
Sergeant
Correctional Officer II
Sergeant
Correctional Officer II

Seven of the individuals who contacted me to participate in this study held the
rank of Correctional Officer II (COII). This rank is established by a tenure of more than
one year as a Correctional Officer I, which is the entry rank for all individuals hired as
officers in correctional facilities. Four of the individuals held the rank of sergeant, which
is a supervisory role one step above correctional officer. These individuals are the next in
rank to correctional officers and are generally responsible for mid-level management
tasks. Two individuals were ranked as lieutenants who are one rank above sergeants and
two ranks above correctional officers. These individuals are considered upper middle
management within the facilities and are responsible for specific shifts and areas of
coverage (i.e., general and specialized housing, recruitment, transportation, special
operations, and physical areas of the prison). One individual was the highest ranked of
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the volunteers and was promoted to captain of his facility prior to data collection. The
captain of the facility is considered the chief of security and all security staff report to this
individual. This person is responsible for the day-to-day operations of staff and offenders
within the facility and serves as the head of security who reports to administrative staff
within the facility.
Even though I emphasized the independence of the research from any particular
corrections organization, there was still some reluctance by some participants to follow
through with interviewing once scheduled. Three individuals (Participants 6, 7, and 10)
contacted me various numbers of days prior to their scheduled interviews to cancel,
generally citing concerns of retaliation and possible reprimand. One individual
(Participant 4), who initially agreed to be interviewed, was offered a promotion
approximately one week prior to the scheduled interview. As a result, this person was
reluctant and subsequently declined interview as a result of fear of possibly jeopardizing
his new position. One other individual (Participant 9) contacted me and scheduled a day
for interviewing. However, on the day of the scheduled interview, the individual reported
to me that her supervisor advised against the interview without internal departmental
approval even though I had told her that she would be participating as a private citizen.
Another individual (Participant 5), who was scheduled for interview, was arrested for
suspected contraband introduction prior to her interview and stated that her lawyer
advised against participation in this study due to potential legal ramifications. One other
participant (Participant 12) was also arrested for charges unrelated to her employment but
was subsequently terminated and declined further participation. Four additional
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individuals (Participants 3, 11, 13, and 14) scheduled interviews, but I was unable contact
them following the initial scheduling. As a result, Participants 3 through 7 and
Participants 9 through 14 were not included in the remainder of the data collection
process (see Table 2).
Table 2
Demographic Data: Initial Recruitment Sample with Withdrawal Reasons
Participant

Age

Gender

Tenure

Rank

Participant 1

39

F

7 years

Correctional Officer II

Reason for withdrawing
participation
N/A-final participant

Participant 2

59

F

28 years

Correctional Officer II

N/A-final participant

Participant 3

28

M

6 years

Lieutenant

Scheduled, no follow-up

Participant 4

32

M

10 years

Captain

Received promotion

Participant 5

42

F

16 years

Lieutenant

Participant 6

47

M

19 years

Correctional Officer II

Arrested for contraband
introduction
Reprimand concerns

Participant 7

52

F

20 years

Correctional Officer II

Reprimand concerns

Participant 8

50

F

27 years

Sergeant

N/A-final participant

Participant 9

32

F

4 years

Correctional Officer II

Participant 10

35

F

4 years

Sergeant

Supervisor advised against
participation
Retaliation concerns

Participant 11

39

F

10 years

Sergeant

Scheduled, no follow-up

Participant 12

47

F

13 years

Correctional Officer II

Participant 13

33

M

5 years

Sergeant

Arrested for undisclosed
reasons
Scheduled, no follow-up

Participant 14

35

M

3 years

Correctional Officer II

Scheduled, no follow-up

In contrast to those who completed the data collection process, these participants’
decisions to discontinue participation prior to interviewing also provided substantive
value related to study limitations, which is explained in greater detail in later sections.
The remaining three participants—Participants 1, 2, and 8—provided interview data that
was utilized in this research (see Table 3).
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Table 3
Demographic Data: Final Interview Participants
Participant

Age

Gender

Tenure

Rank

Participant 1

39

F

7 years

Correctional Officer II

Participant 2

59

F

28 years

Correctional Officer II

Participant 8

50

F

27 years

Sergeant

More women than men contacted me for during recruitment for this study. A
total of nine female and five male participants were a part of the overall sample. The
ranks of these individuals were diverse across the entry- and mid-level management roles
with five women and two men representing the Correctional Officer II group and three
women and one man representing the sergeant group. The only group that showed equal
representation was the rank of lieutenant with one male and one female participant. The
only captain represented in the recruitment sample was male. Of these initial volunteers,
the 11 who subsequently withdrew participation were: three female COIIs, two male
COIIs, two female sergeants, one male sergeant, both the male and female lieutenants,
and the male captain.
The ages of the sample of nonparticipating volunteers ranged from 28 to 52 years
old with an average age of 38.36 years for the group. The tenures of these individuals
were between 3 and 20 years with an average length of 10 years on the job. The
youngest volunteer in this group was a 28-year-old male with the second highest rank but
one of the shortest tenures at 6 years. The shortest-tenured employee of the initial
nonparticipating recruits was a 35-year-old male with the lowest rank (COII) and 3 years
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of service, whereas the oldest and longest-tenured of these individuals was a 50-year-old
female COII with 20 years of service.
For the final collection of data, those who elected to participate were all females
and maintained the ranks of Correctional Officer II (n = 2) and sergeant (n = 1). The
ages represented by those who were interviewed were 39, 50, and 59 years old—an
average age of 49.33—with a significant gap of 20 years between the oldest and youngest
participants. Of this cohort, the highest-ranked participant—a 50-year-old female
sergeant with 27 years of service—was neither the oldest nor the individual with the
longest tenure. The youngest final participant (a 39-year-old female) was the shortesttenured (7 years) and shared rank (COII) with the oldest participant (a 59-year-old
female) who was also the longest-tenured (28 years). The average tenure within this
group was 20.67 years with a range of 21 years between the shortest- and longest-tenured
participants of the interview.
Data Collection
As stated in the social media announcement, I explained during preinterview
conversations that interviews would be conducted away from employment sites to
encourage confidentiality and anonymity. Additionally, conducting off-site interviews
would also build trust between the researcher and the interviewees as this has been cited
as a limitation in research by previous correctional researchers. Based on withdrawal
rates during the recruitment phase, I remained cognizant of potential underlying concerns
related to participants answering questions regarding deviant employee behaviors. In
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attempts to overcome these preinterview concerns, these individuals were reminded that
anonymity and confidentiality would be observed throughout the research process.
In total, three participants (Participants 1, 2, and 8) were interviewed as part of
this study. This number was significantly lower than the originally stated range of 8 to
10 participants due to the factors mentioned earlier in the chapter. Because
phenomenological research emphasizes the importance of depth and quality in
understanding individual experiences, this number was identified as sufficient in meeting
the needs of this study. Participants were interviewed at their convenience through video
conferencing due to weather and travel concerns. The participants were provided with
the informed consent via email prior to the scheduled interview and verbally confirmed
their consent as well. Interviews ranged in time from approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour
and 10 minutes and each interview was recorded on two audio recorders.
Participants were asked two preinterview questions to confirm on-record the
length of time as a corrections officer and the age each began working as an officer.
These questions were followed by 12 main interview questions that allowed for
elaboration on individual experience with exposure to cellphone contraband introduction
and reporting behaviors regarding this activity. The main interview questions often
provided opportunity for expansion through follow-up questioning, which allowed for
greater depth and detail in understanding the phenomenon of interest. The questions
were categorically divided to address perceptions of cellphone contraband violators and
the work environment as well as perceptions of reporting behaviors. Sample questions
include the following:
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•

In your opinion, why do you believe some correctional officers participate in
cellphone contraband introduction and why do you think others do not?

•

What role does the structural rigidity (rules, paramilitary, physical barriers and
isolation) of the prison environment have on cellphone contraband introduction
activity?

•

In your opinion, is the prison work environment receptive to those who express
concerns of suspected or confirmed contraband introduction by other officers?

At the conclusion of the main interview, participants were asked two follow-up questions
to allow for open expression of any information not covered earlier in the interview
process and to determine whether they wanted to participate in the member-checking
process.
Data Analysis
Transcription
I transcribed the interviews myself instead of using an outside transcription
service as identified in the previous chapter. This was decided due to my concerns of
misinterpretations of audio, which could impact coding and interpretation. Instead, I
decided to use transcription software that was compatible with one of the audio recorders
used for the interview to transcribe each interview. Once the software provided a rough
transcript of each interview, I then listened to each interview and checked each line of the
document against the recordings for accuracy. The final transcripts were then used for
the manual code-recode process to identify the following themes and subthemes present
within the data.
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Themes
Three central themes relevant to the phenomenon of interest emerged as a result
of coding the data presented in the participant interviews. These themes—peer dynamics,
personal characteristics, and organizational climate structure—served to illustrate the
experiences of the participants relative to cellphone contraband introduction and officer
violators. ‘Personal characteristics’ were identified as individualized criteria believed as
playing some role in the decision-making of those involved in cellphone contraband
introduction. A number of specific subthemes were prevalent throughout the participant
data. However, these were relatively consistent across the sample. In looking at the
subthemes associated with the ‘personal characteristics’ theme, morality, susceptibility to
manipulation, and thrill seeking were prominent among all three participants. The ‘peer
dynamics’ theme was indicative of interpersonal factors among staff that these
individuals perceived as contributive to officer-related incidents of cellphone contraband
introduction. Belongingness and support were two of the most common subthemes
relative to peer dynamics and cellphone contraband introduction. Specifically,
organizational moral and social support as well as social acceptance were recognized as
having significant impacts on officer decision-making. Finally, ‘organizational climate
structure’ highlighted organization-specific antecedents that reinforced the behavior of
contraband violators. The associated subthemes—safety, exposure, consistency, and
transparency—were highlighted as dominant factors in reporting behaviors.
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Evidence of Trustworthiness
The participant selection process assisted with maintaining the transferability of
the data findings. As previously stated, a total of fourteen participants contacted the
researcher with the intention of providing data for this study. While all fourteen did not
end up participating in the data collection process, the heterogeneity of the initial sample
still has important implications. Tenure and exposure were the inclusionary criteria for
this study which was provided at the outset as part of the social media announcement
used for recruitment. The individuals who contacted the researcher did so with the
understanding that they would be considered for participation if they have worked at least
two years as a certified peace officer and have exposure to at least one incident of
cellphone contraband introduction. It is significant to note the individuals who later
declined participation were of various tenures, ranks, ages, and genders while those who
completed the data collection process were of various ages, rank, and tenure but not
gender. While these demographics were not significant in participant selection, they may
have some significance in the data implications.
In order to ensure the credibility of the analyzed data, the researcher implored
member-checking to confirm interpretative findings. The three participants were asked at
the conclusion of their interviews whether they wanted to participate in this particular
process at which time only two participants agreed to review the data interpretations for
accuracy. Both confirmed that the interpretations ascertained from the interview data
were in line with their intended statements and neither identified any discrepancies or
misrepresentations. The confirmation of interpretation accuracy was also a testament to
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findings unimpeded by any underlying researcher bias. As stated in the previous chapter,
the researcher worked to minimize the imposition of biases by journaling thoughts that
would impact objectivity in data analysis. The only relevant bias the researcher was able
to identify was that those who participated in the interview process would not be open
and forthcoming regarding this subject matter especially given the difficulty experienced
in securing those who intended to follow through with the actual interview process. The
researcher was also concerned that the information provided would serve to promote the
participants’ employers or glamorize the organization in order to minimize the risk of
revealing any negative information. However, the information obtained from the
interviewees was in-depth and was perceived by the researcher as authentic because it did
not serve to glamorize the their employer. The researcher, having minimal experience
with the phenomenon of interest, was able to interpret the information provided by the
participants as it was presented through the interviews without any undue influence.
Results
Officer Perceptions of Cellphone Contraband Violators
According to the data, correctional officers have strong opinions regarding
individuals who participate in cellphone contraband introduction. All three participants
agreed that morality played a significant role in cellphone contraband introduction.
Participant 1 suggested that strong morals, integrity, and pride in one’s role could help to
minimize the desire to engage in this form of deviant workplace behavior, which was
later echoed by the other participants. Participant 1 stated,
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I would never in a million years bring an inmate anything. Not a piece of gum,
contraband, money, because it’s all about integrity…holding true to your sworn
oath to the state and I think it’s the type of person you are. You’re either going to
do it or you’re not.
This was also reflected in the sentiments of the senior ranking member among the
participants who stated, “I think it comes down to the type of person that is choosing to
work here…a person is either going to do it or they won’t”.
Susceptibility to manipulation was noted by all three participants as a significant
indicator of one’s likeliness to participate in cellphone contraband introduction. Based
on their experiences, the consensus among the group was that low self-esteem was
usually characteristic of the females who engaged in cellphone contraband introduction
while financial status improvement was common among male violators. It was
interesting to note that even though financial incentive was identified as a motivator for
male participants, only Participant 2 believed poor salary was a deciding factor among
violators. Additionally, Participants 1 and 8 suggested thrill-seeking as an underlying
motive for cellphone contraband activity while Participant 2 suggested
institutionalization—or the subconscious emulation of inmate behaviors and
characteristics by officers—as a primary motive.
All three participants had differing opinions regarding age, education, and rank as
deterrents for deviant workplace behaviors among fellow officers. Participant 1
suggested neither age nor education played any significant role in deterring or
encouraging cellphone contraband introduction among fellow officers. Participants 2 and
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8 both agreed that poor education could increase the likeliness that a person would elect
to engage in this type of behavior. Participant 8 also suggested that age could be a factor
in the decision-making associated with cellphone contraband introduction. According to
this participant,
[T]hey recruit young people from the local high schools… a lot of times they
don’t know any better and haven’t had any real job exposure and they don’t
recognize the impact that something like that can have on them in the future.
In discussing the relationship between rank and cellphone contraband violators,
participants 1 and 8 had differing but noteworthy opinions. According to participant 1,
contraband introduction is not uncommon among senior ranking staff (such as
lieutenants, captains, and wardens) which is suggestive of rank serving no significant role
in deterrence. As an indication of her recognition of the fact that the behavior that is
modeled by supervisory staff is the behavior that will most likely be emulated by lower
ranked staff Participant 8 stated, “I try to be as ethical as possible and I try to display that
to my staff.”
In reporting their perceptions of cellphone violators, all three participants were
unanimous in their beliefs that the behavior changes their view of the individual as
opposed to the organization. Participants 1 and 2 intimated that they would no longer
trust an officer who was suspected of introducing contraband into their workplace. Both
participants felt that this behavior was not only a violation of trust between co-workers
but it was also a violation of public trust. As a the only participating supervisor,
participant 8 presented a unique perspective regarding contraband violators as she
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reported feeling a sense of disappointment in staff identified as introducing contraband.
According to this participant, “I feel like it’s a reflection of me (leadership) because
maybe they did it because they felt like they couldn’t reach out to any of us for help.”
Climate and Cellphone Contraband Introduction
While perceptions of individual violators are most effected by incidents of
contraband deviance, the participants were also able to conceptualize ways in which the
organizational climate inadvertently reinforces this behavior. The participants agreed
that while cellphone contraband introduction is not condoned, it is generally an
anticipated occurrence among staff members. The participants suggested that this
expectation creates a certain degree of cynicism among staff, particularly security staff,
because, as one participant explained, “[I]t’s almost like a waiting game to see who it’s
going to be.”
The participants explained that cellphone contraband introduction is an issue that
is discussed ad nauseum during one’s tenure as a correctional officer beginning with
basic correctional officer training (BCOT) and continuing with annual mandatory
trainings. It is also heavily discussed among staff when incidents occur primarily in an
unofficial, fact-seeking capacity. All three participants conceded an unspoken separation
between security staff and civilian staff and indicated that contraband violations by
civilian staff often involved illegal substances (including narcotics and cigarettes) and
sexual interactions. According to the participants, these incidents are not internalized to
the same extent as violations by fellow officers. Participant 1 suggested that cellphone
contraband introduction was more common among security staff because of the constant
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proximity to inmates and the lack of consistent scrutiny of security personnel upon
entrance. This same participant also opined that this same inconsistency often aids higher
ranking individuals with contraband introduction which is why, in her opinion, rank plays
an insignificant role in deterrence. Participant 2 stated that when made aware of
incidents of contraband introduction she expects the violator to be civilian personnel as
opposed to security staff while participant 8 stated that the social distance between the
two staff groups allows her to easily disconnect from these incidents when they involve
civilian staff.
Additionally, participants surmised poor morale and lack of support as
instrumental organizational elements in contraband introduction among security staff.
Participants concurred that the climate within their individual work environments
generally lacked in support from peers, superiors, and administration. Participants 2 and
8 attested to the necessity of organizational support when faced with understaffing, long
shifts, and the underlying dangers within correctional facilities. Participant 1 explained
that within-group moral and social support are critical among officers because of the
inherent stress associated with the work environment. She disclosed that based on her
interactions with non-correctional staff via social media, the community perception is that
all correctional officers participate in some form of contraband introduction. According
to her, this misconception forces correctional officers to seek out support among their
fellow officers and that support could be either positive or negative depending on the
group. Additionally, this participant theorized that social acceptance among officers—
particularly young officers—often dictates behaviors within the workplace, a theory
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supported by Participant 8. Because of the reported insufficiency regarding
intraorganizational support, familial support and external social support were suggested
as protective factors in deterring contraband introduction among officers even though
neither participant believed the problem would ever fully end. In line with this,
Participant 1 asserted that justifications or minimizations of unethical or illegal behavior
within one’s social support could affect the decision-making process of an officer with
Participant 8 reinforcing this position stating, “it (contraband introduction) isn’t that
uncommon which means the individuals start to normalize it which makes participation
that much easier to rationalize.”
Climate and Reporting Behaviors
Safety, exposure, consistency, and transparency were implicated as salient
concepts in the discussion of reporting behaviors in corrections. When questioned about
administrative receptiveness and officer comfort in reporting suspected contraband
introduction, the participants’ responses differed in some areas. The participants were
unanimous in identifying concerns for safety as the primary cause for reporting other
officers suspected of contraband introduction. Participant 1’s stated rationale for
reporting was “we are a brotherhood, yes, but…I’m protecting myself first and
foremost.” Similarly, Participant 2 state, “I start to fear for my safety… anyone who is
compromised in that manner can’t be trusted. I don’t feel comfortable working around
them anymore.” Participant 8 described a similar sentiment in that by not participating in
this type of behavior, she has not compromised the safety of her staff as a supervisor.
Yet while the participants credited the organization with attempting to proactively
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discourage staff participation in contraband introduction through routine trainings, they
also credited consistent exposure to the problem as an inadvertent reinforcement for
some. Participants 1 and 8 suggested consistent exposure combined with inconsistent
repercussive actions bolster an individual’s ability to justify participation in cellphone
contraband introduction. According to these participants, staff are made aware of these
incidents and often find out later that accused parties do not consistently face the
repercussions outlined in policies and trainings. Participants 1 and 8 also explained that
punishment discretion is often left to individual facilities and decisions regarding
termination and resignation in lieu of termination determined by facility administration
while cases that involve arrest and prosecution are based on the discretion of the district
attorney. These same participants concurred that when officer violators face significant
consequences, specifically arrest and prosecution, other officers understand and
appreciate the gravity of the situation. According to Participant 8, “[I]f they thought the
punishment would be severe enough, they would probably not want to do it.” When less
severe consequences were imposed officers, the participants reported feeling a sense of
disappointment and silent complacency on behalf of the department.
Additionally, these participants suggested a lack of transparency by the
department—as evidenced through community relations and also through
intraorganizational relations—as having a significant role in participation as well as
reporting behaviors. Participant 1 was the only participant who identified administrators
as being receptive to officers reporting contraband violators. However, this participant
also agreed with Participants 2 and 8 in noting that reporting incidents of suspected
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contraband introduction seemingly goes unanswered. At least two participants reported
that it was not uncommon for contraband violation incidents to be handled “quietly” so as
to not bring unwanted attention to the department. The participants posited that this lack
of transparency was prevalent within the organizational climate. Participant 2 believed
the organization’s lack of transparency was a result of reputation preservation and
community relations.
I think the agency’s lack of real acknowledgement of the problem leaves it
unaddressed and allows it to continue to run rampant and I think people know it.
The agency doesn’t want the public to know that there are some people who are
supposed to manage these people who actually get caught up in bringing in
contraband.
Participant 8 opined:
I still feel like the department is trying to brush it under the rug but it further
reinforces the notion that they—as a department—are not taking as active of a
role in confronting the problem head on…The agency underreports the numbers
because they don’t want the department to seem more corrupt in public opinion
than it really is.
Participant 1, on the other hand, attributed transparency issues with investigation
preservation by stating, “I think they are receptive but a lot of times they may act like
they’re not because they have certain things in the work or they got somebody being
investigated.” According to the participants, the lack of transparency also deterred
reporting because officers feel as though their concerns are not being taken seriously or
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are being ignored. Additionally, the participants reported an awareness of at least one
incident of a fellow officer reporting their suspicions and subsequently receiving negative
treatment by peers and superiors. Participants 1 and 2 indicated that situations that
resulted in peer ostracization diminished within-group trust. This lack of transparency is
concerning for officers because it not only undermines the strict and rigid façade of the
paramilitary prison-system but it also negatively-impacts the morale of those who work
within the organization
Summary
The data recruitment, collection, and analysis processes associated with this study
followed most procedures as described in the previous chapter in order to answer the
foundational research questions. According to the data reported in this study, the
perpetration of unethical and illegal acts by rogue officers were attributed solely to the
individual and not the environment in which they work. Deviant acts committed by
fellow officers were not viewed as a derivative of the work environment and instead were
considered moral deficits on the part of the actor. Contraband introduction was identified
as a persistent, yet predictable threat and cellphone contraband introduction was indicated
as an evolution of this unending problem. However, there were mixed perceptions in
regard to reporting behaviors while the officers who declined participation provided
support for the consideration of possible peer and administrative discouragement. The
results of this chapter are explored further in the final chapter of this study.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The central purpose of this study was to gain perceptual insight into the lived
experiences of correctional officers who, at some point during their careers, have
experienced cellphone contraband introduction by fellow officers. The findings of this
study indicate that officers are likely to have a negative view of the individual violator.
Additionally, some officers may feel as though the organizational climate does little to
deter the behaviors of rogue officers. As a result of this climate, officers may also
experience some hesitation in reporting suspected contraband introduction by fellow
officers.
Interpretation of the Findings
Ethical climate theory served as the theoretical foundation for this study in order
to assist in the exploration of institutional factors and social dynamics within the
correctional environment that could potentially reinforce contraband introduction among
officers. Ethical climate theory establishes the existence of unspoken guidelines within
an organization that dictate whether employee behaviors are viewed as acceptable or
unacceptable based on an underlying system of rewards and punishment. Employee
behaviors within the organization could be considered unethical or immoral to those
outside the organization but could also be viewed as justifiable within the organization
depending on the norms that exist within the organizational climate. According to ethical
climate theory, the correctional climate is one that most aligns with both law and code
and rules climates. Law and code climate sets the expectation that employees will adhere

85
to legal and professional standards, whereas rules climate requires employees to follow
all company rules and procedures (Victor & Cullen, 1998). Although this may be the
image the department hopes to portray to outsiders, the experiences described by the
participants suggests a disconnect between perception and reality. Prior to the
commencement of this study, the available data provided little insight into the differences
of perceived versus actual organizational climate through the lens of those who work in
these environments. Based on the data provided, correctional officers could perceive the
organizational climate as having some role in contraband introduction behaviors and the
reporting of these behaviors to administration.
Within the context of this theory, the data confirm the existence of some form of
ethical dissonance within the correctional environment. When discussing their individual
experiences with incidents of officer-involved contraband introduction, the consensus
among the participants was that the perception of the participating officer is irrevocably
altered. Although the participants did not explicitly state a change in perceptions of their
work environments, the data support a less than favorable view of the organization in
regard to this specific topic as evidenced by their reporting of a general disappointment
with the organization’s lack of prevention efforts. The data also indicate that
accountability avoidance and responsibility evasion may be reinforced by the
organizational climate due to inconsistencies in punishment and reprimand. Additionally,
noncomplicit officers are less likely to feel empowered to report their suspicions of
possible violators due to perceived lack of administrative interest and potential retaliation
for expressing concern for this behavior. In other words, noncomplicit officers believe
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potential violators are less likely to be deterred by established consequences because
those consequences are not consistently reinforced during known incidents of contraband
introduction.
The findings of this study also reiterate contributory factors of contraband
introduction as previously highlighted in the existing literature. The relevant literature
suggests the existence of factors within the correctional work setting that are instrumental
to the cellphone contraband market (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; York, 2016; CAPI, 2016;
Farnese et al., 2016). These factors include individual characteristics, peer dynamics, and
intraorganizational dynamics—similar to those identified within this study—that
influence employee decision-making regarding deviant behaviors as correctional
employees. Within the context of the available literature, this study confirms the roles of
morality, social support, and belongingness in this decision-making process. Financial
incentives and self-esteem were also confirmed as contributing agents to engagement in
contraband activity; however, these factors were identified as secondary extensions of the
others. The findings also reinforce correctional employees’ valuation of support by not
only those outside of the workplace but also within the immediate work environment,
particularly administrative support. Previous researchers have emphasized correctional
employees’ inability to identify sufficient support within their work environment as
negatively impacting their views of their workplace and subsequent interactions with
peers and superiors (Worley, 2016; Worley & Worley, 2011, 2013). Further, this lack of
organizational support was also implicated as a potential catalyst for unethical behaviors
within the workplace. In this regard, the current study confirms the findings of previous
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studies while also suggesting that employees may experience difficulty in identifying
sources of support within their organization which increases officers’ apathy and
indifference towards deviancy issues such as cellphone contraband introduction.
Additionally, this study extends the current body of literature by providing additional
insight into officers’ views of contraband activity as potentially unavoidable within the
correctional work environment.
Limitations of the Study
I anticipated limitations related to generalizability, time-limited data collection,
and the impact of the correctional officer code on sampling size. The data collected are
reflective of individuals who have experienced cellphone contraband introduction while
employed as correctional officers. All participants—including those who did not
participate in the data collection phase—were from the same geographical area and were
of various experience levels and tenures. Given that the three individuals who
participated in the data collection process were from the same geographical location, the
geographic limitation is one that remains relevant in this study.
The data collection process was conducted once but with individuals who had
different tenures and rank. The main concern with a time-limited study is that it is not
reflective of an experience over the course of time and provides a single snapshot of the
phenomenon at a specific period of time. However, the significance of the tenure points
and rank differences allows for insight into this phenomenon at different points of the
career trajectory. Because two individuals were of the same rank but at different points
in their careers (early career and approaching retirement), their experiences regarding the
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same phenomenon have different implications relative to their work history in
corrections. The tenure of the participant with the highest rank was one year shorter than
that of the longest-tenured participant; however, their perceptions regarding certain
aspects of the phenomenon were also in slight contrast. Therefore, differences and
similarities indicated by these participants may have some application to others who hold
similar ranks and tenures. Experiences of those who fall midway between these career
points as well as those of higher rank were unaccounted for in this study, which offers
opportunity for exploration.
It is important to note that the final sampling size was smaller than anticipated. In
keeping with the research plan, voluntary participants contacted me to express interest in
providing data for the study. The identified range of eight to 10 participants was initially
met and included scheduled interviews for all except one participant. At some point, the
majority of these individuals expressed no interest in further participation in the study.
As the participants began to withdraw from the study, three additional participants
expressed interest in the study bringing the total of volunteers to 14. However, these two
participants also declined further participation by avoiding additional contact. Only one
of the participants who completed data collection offered to share my contact information
with other prospective participants; however, no additional volunteers were identified.
By exhausting the sampling procedures identified in Chapter 3, I was confident in
proceeding with the remaining steps of the study.
Although the data provided were sufficient for extrapolating relevant findings,
sample size is important when determining saturation in any qualitative study. The data
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and findings relative to the predetermined research questions were consistent throughout
with few identifiable discrepancies noted within subareas—such as the influence of
education on one’s willingness to participate in cellphone contraband introduction. Also,
the interview participants were homogenous in gender but not rank, age, or length of
tenure, which provides additional credibility to response consistency among them. As
such, saturation can be confirmed to a certain extent; however, additional data collected
as an extension of this study could help provide additional confirmation.
In addition, the correctional officer code could be implicated as a limitation in
sampling. Similar to the code of silence among other law enforcement officers, the
correctional officer code discourages the sharing of information that would be harmful to
the reputation of other officers or the organization for which they work. Initially, those
interested in participation in the study voluntarily contacted me and provided relevant
demographic information in anticipation of completing the data collection process.
Following the completion of interviews with the first two participants, I began to
experience challenges with participants following through with the data collection
process. With the exception of the eighth participant, who participated in interviewing,
and the two participants who experienced legal concerns during the course of the
recruitment process, the remaining nine participants were most likely reluctant to
participate due to the unspoken code of silence. At least three of the participants openly
spoke of retaliation concerns during post-scheduling cancellations. Although the others
did not overtly express the same concerns, it can be inferred that these individuals likely
became wary of answering questions that involved other officers for one reason or
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another. Given the timing of the cancellations—after interview times were scheduled—
one could speculate that these officers had spoken with other officers or supervisors and
were either directly or indirectly discouraged from ongoing participation in the study.
One individual stated that her supervisor told her that she would need permission to
participate in the study, which was a factually inaccurate statement given that she was
informed by me that she would be interviewed as a private citizen and not as a
representative of her organization. However, in working in an environment that
discourages open participation with outsiders, once the seed of doubt was planted it was
unlikely that she could be convinced that her participation would not subject her to any
official reprimand or punitive actions from her employer. The others most likely
received similar misinformation from within their work environment and were deterred
from continued participation as a result. Therefore, it is probable that those who
subsequently declined participation in interviewing without any formal explanation were
impacted by this informal code of conduct.
Additionally, the time-lapse between recruitment and data collection may have
provided the officers with time to reconsider their involvement and the possible
implications associated with participating in this type of research. Even though the
purpose of the research was detailed for the participants, it would not be surprising if,
over time, these individuals assumed an underlying motive or agenda associated with
studying this particular phenomenon. This is especially likely to be true if I was viewed
as an outsider or non-law enforcement because blind loyalty is a central tenet within
many, if not all, law enforcement agencies, even if it comes at the detriment of others. If
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participants believed I was attempting to “trap” or “trick” them into sharing information
that could be used against them later on or that the information would be shared with
outside law enforcement, this could have increased their angst and hesitation in moving
forward with data collection efforts. Based on historical references and examples,
officers in any area of law enforcement are often reluctant to report on other rogue
officers’ behaviors even with the protection of anonymity and confidentiality (York,
2016; Dennehy & Nantel, 2006; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). The recourse for reporting
officer offenses is often worse for the witnesses and creates an intolerable work life
(Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007). Even with my disassociation with the department of
corrections, officers remained reluctant to fully cooperate throughout the entire process of
the study. Coordinating efforts with the organization most likely would not have changed
this and, instead, probably would have encouraged participant deception in order to deter
negative administrative repercussions. It also would have allowed the department an
opportunity to encourage favorable reporting by officers which would disproportionately
impact the accuracy of the data. In understanding this reality, it was unlikely that any
changes to the process of this study would have significantly improved participation.
Recommendations
The completion of this study yielded a number of significant recommendations
for future research. Due to the sensitive nature of this particular topic, future studies
should consider conducting written interviews with participants. This may help minimize
some reluctance on behalf of participants who may be more willing to engage in data
collection through a less personal method. Also, consideration for participants who are
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no longer employed in corrections may also be useful in securing participants for data
collection. Individuals who are no longer employed with the agency may be less likely to
experience hesitation relative to retaliation concerns if there is some distance between
them and their former employer. Additionally, expanding the target population to include
multiple states or regions might improve participation. While this might also present
other limitations not represented in this study, it could also improve generalizability
concerns as well as increase the breadth of relevant data. It would not be unwise to
consider working in conjunction with an interested agency; however, this would still
create concerns regarding participant authenticity. Future studies might also explore the
role of the correctional climate in discrepancies in deviance (i.e., male violators versus
female violators, civilian staff violators versus security staff violators) or whether
adherence to organizational climate in corrections is susceptible to certain demographics.
Exploration of this phenomenon can also extend into other areas of consideration such as
jails versus prisons, state versus federal facilities, and variations in offender custody
level. Distinctions such as these are significant within correctional environments as they
often contribute to noticeable variations within each independent climate.
Implications
Corrections organizations around the world continue to lose the war with
cellphone contraband. Correctional administrators often blame the introduction of
contraband on external forces and view it as a problem in need of external regulation,
hence the development of tougher laws and regulatory policies to address this issue. This
study, however, demonstrates that the unwillingness of these administrators to reflect on
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internal contributors will continue to diminish their ability eradicate this problem. Rather
than seeking out external contributors, this study indicates the need for reform of internal
practices in order to recalibrate the climate so that policy and practice are in alignment.
Policies are only as good as the agencies who reinforce them and based on the data
provided in this study, policy reinforcement is a central issue in contraband introduction
according to the people who are directly impacted by it. Correctional departments across
the country have some form of policy that directly deals with contraband introduction;
however, it is unlikely that poor reinforcement is characteristic of only one or two of
these departments. And with an increase in public attention focused on criminal justice
reform, some community shareholders believe cellphones in correctional environments
aid in increased transparency as well as insight into conditions and treatment of
individuals within these institutions. As a result, there are some who believe cellphones
in prison serve some beneficent purpose and should not be completely restricted. This
line of thought further substantiates the need for correctional researchers to expand the
body of knowledge centered around the dangers of cellphone contraband introduction
within correctional facilities. Similarly, it is imperative that departments work to ensure
their policies are guided by this research and are fully reinforced without exception
because inconsistencies in punishment detract from the significance of the behavior as
well as the virtue of the organization. Additionally, this study further supports the basic
tenants of ethical climate theory by adding to the available body of climate literature
within correctional organizations. Conducting correctional research from a climate-based
theoretical foundation allows for the application of this theoretical foundation in the
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exploration of other areas within correctional research. Similarly, climate-based
correctional research also provides for deeper exploration into other forms of correctional
deviance that may not have been explored with consideration for the role of
organizational norms.
Conclusion
Corrections officers are viewed as gatekeepers and protectors by the community,
sheltering law-abiding citizens from those who violate societal norms. This image
becomes tarnished each time an officer is exposed for introducing contraband into an
institution. Before this behavior becomes the norm rather than the exception, it is
imperative that measures are taken to decrease the occurrence. By exploring the
perceptions of those who have been impacted by contraband introduction, this study
expounds upon the existing body of literature to provide greater depth and clarity for
researchers, administrators, and policy developers alike.
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